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From Circular Migrants in the Mines to Transnational Polygynists in the Townships: A Century of Transformation in Central Mozambican Male Migration Regimes (1900-1999)

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ABSTRACT

This article tracks the most significant transformations in the international migration regime between central Mozambique and South Africa throughout the twentieth century as the product of complex and continuous interactions between the broader political-economic environment and local forms of gendered and inter-generational social struggle. A century of perspective brings into resolution the complex linkages between forms of migrancy such as labour migration and refugee displacement that are usually treated as categorically distinct, but which are demonstrated here to significantly inform each other. As a result of its deployment as a strategy for coping with various forms of political duress, seizing new economic opportunity, and negotiating local social relations, the meaning and practice of migration has been transformed throughout the twentieth century from a strategy for ensuring social reproduction back in Mozambique into the indispensable mechanism for enacting transnational lives that presume and pursue simultaneous social and economic investment and involvement in both South Africa and in Mozambique.

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INTRODUCTION

This article tracks the most significant transformations in the international migration regime between central Mozambique and South Africa throughout the twentieth century as the product of complex and continuous interactions between the broader political-economic environment and local forms of gendered and inter-generational social struggle. The focus of this study is on migrant men from the current day district of Machaze, located in central Mozambique immediately north of the Save river. Throughout the twentieth century the people of Machaze experienced two periods of intensification in colonial forced-labour recruitment (1907–1926 and 1942–1962), the abrupt end of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, and the beginning of a devastating post-colonial civil war (1977–1992) that ultimately displaced over half of its population. This study demonstrates how migration was continuously re-deployed and adapted throughout the twentieth century as a strategy for navigating these successive political and economic dispensations and shocks – even as it became simultaneously implicated in and affected by – strategies of local socio-economic differentiation and struggles over inter-generational and gendered power within extended households. This ethno-historical case-study examination thus provides a detailed example of how Mozambican – and other migration regimes in sub-Saharan Africa – have been continuously re-constituted at the point where broader macro-economic trends intersect with micro-political struggles that are played out in culturally specific terms.¹

A century of perspective also allows this study to bring into resolution the complex linkages and mutually informing relationships between forms of migrancy that are often analytically approached as categorically distinct and yet which can be demonstrated to significantly inform each other. In the southern African region a great deal of historical research on labour migration has privileged migrants working (legally) in the mining industry (Rita-Ferreira, 1963; Wople, 1972; First, 1983; Murray, 1981; Jeeves, 1985; Covane, 2001; Crush, Jeeves and Yudelmann, 1991; Moodie, 1994; Crush and James, 1995; DeVletter, 2000; but see Chilundo, 2001; Neves, 1998), while a more recent body of scholarship has focused more closely on those “invisible” migrants to peri-urban areas now estimated to constitute the overwhelming majority of foreign nationals in South Africa (Minaar and Hough, 1996; McDonald, 2000; Crush and McDonald, 2002, Landau 2006). Meanwhile, the study of forced migration in southern Africa has also thrived (e.g. Mazur, 1989;

Wilson, 1992, 1994; Wilson and Nunes, 1994; Ranger, 1994; Dolan, 1999; Lubkemann, 2000b, 2002b, 2008; Sommers, 2001; Englund, 2002), yet largely in isolation from the study of labour migration, and the relationships between refugee and labour migration have been left largely unscrutinized (but, see Hughes, 1999; Polzer, 2004, 2005). This study documents the connections among all three of these forms of migration (refugee, legal/formal labour migration, and informal labour migration) and how these flows have mutually informed each other.

By taking a broad historical perspective that spans nearly a century, this article first explores the confluence of political, economic, and social forces that led migrants from Machaze to eschew formal employment in the mines and seek informal and technically illegal alternatives in the manufacturing sector of the peri-urban Vaal region (in South Africa) during the three decades following World War II. It then documents how social transformations introduced by this shift influenced the socio-demographic organization and profile of refugee migration during the Mozambican civil war (1978–1992). Finally this article documents how the new social possibilities that resulted from engendered patterns of wartime displacement profoundly transformed the meaning and patterns of labour migrancy during the first post-war decade (1992–2002). By tracing the historical interconnections between formal and informal, and labour and refugee migration flows, and situating migration in relation to both local social struggles and broader political and economic change, this article explains how the meaning and practice of migration has been transformed throughout the twentieth century: from a strategy for ensuring social reproduction back in Mozambique into the indispensable mechanism for enacting transnational life strategies that presume simultaneous social and economic investment and involvement in both South Africa and in Mozambique.

LABOUR MIGRATION IN CENTRAL MOZAMBIQUE UNDER THE COMPANHIA DE MOCAMBIQUE 1893–1942

The lived horizons of Machazian “social worlds” (Marx, 1990) have long transcended territorial and political boundaries in ways that centered and depended upon various forms of migrancy. Throughout the twentieth century Machazian subsistence strategies revolved around a social division of labour between female subsistence agriculture largely confined to Machaze and male migration to South Africa in pursuit of wage-labour. The earliest accounts from the colonial administrators who

arrived in the Machaze area in order to establish Portuguese rule after the defeat of Gugunhanna in 1895 clearly establish that even in this area to the north of the Save river,² circular labour migration to South Africa had already become a well-established practice prior to the turn of the century (see also Harries, 1994). Thus, in 1906 the local Companhia administrator reported:

...at the end of this year a genuine cloud of recruiters descended on our frontiers in English territory in order to contract our natives to work in the mines of the Transvaal...the main motivation of the native of Mossurize to Mashonaland (in present-day Zimbabwe) is the high wage there and that since the withdrawal of Gugunhanna all those belonging to the tribes that emigrated to Inhambane (Bilene) have become accustomed to seeking work on the Transvaal and even though they have returned to their former lands now in this circumscription they maintain the habit of migrating to the Transvaal in order to obtain the 30 pounds necessary for cafreal marriage (Relatorio Annual, Mossurize, 1906).

Following the 1884 Berlin conference, the Portuguese colonial enterprise was faced with the challenge of effectively occupying the territory it claimed. Unable to meet that challenge directly it granted combined economic and political administration rights over a large part of the Mozambican territory to a series of chartered companies. The Companhia de Mocambique was the longest-lived of these, being granted a large part of the area of present-day Manica, Sofala, and Gaza provinces where it administered colonial rule from 1893 to 1942.

Throughout its tenure a major objective of the Companhia in Mossurize circumscription (of which Machaze, then known as Madanda, was a part) was the recruitment of forced labour for agricultural and industrial enterprises within its borders. To this end it continuously sought to stem what it regarded as an illegal flow of circular labour migration between the area under its authority and South Africa. From the very outset and throughout the Companhia's entire tenure local officials struggled with this daunting task, well aware that significant wage differentials and poor working conditions within the colony made employment in South Africa a far more attractive option to the residents of Machaze and surrounding areas. A review of local administrator reports clearly reveals that wages in South Africa remained much higher throughout the Companhia's tenure (consistently at least 3 to 4 times higher) (Mossurize Relatorios Annuais, 1906, 1908; 1912, 1917, 1925; 1934; Auto da Banja-Mossurize, February 5, 1923).

Yet despite the fact that Machaze lay to the north of the 22nd parallel, technically rendering its residents legally ineligible to work in South Africa, young men from within the Companhia's territory could, with relative ease, pass themselves off as residents of areas south of the Save where recruitment for the South African mines was legal. Many were assisted by professional labour recruiters who infiltrated the Companhia's territory on behalf of South African enterprises – fully knowledgeable of the Companhia administrators' inability to police the vast circumscription.³

Efforts by the Companhia's administrators to force the local traditional authorities to stem this flow and redirect local labour to the Companhia's territory proved futile, and in fact, counterproductive. The result of the first major effort to intensify forced labour recruitment in 1907 was a precipitous drop in the number of huts counted annually as residents simply moved across the international border or into more remote and less accessible areas of this vast circumscription. Between 1908 and 1912 the district administrator of Mossurize counted a total of 1479 "huts" that were lost to movement across the colonial border into English territory in order to escape the Companhia's forced labour practices (Mossurize Relatorio- September 14, 1912). From 1912 to 1917 as the Companhia's labour recruitment efforts continued unabated the total population in the district dropped from 26,677 to 17,535 – a loss of over 34 per cent (Mossurize Relatorio-Arrolamento e Recenseamento, 1918). By 1922 the total population had dropped to a new low of 16,331 (Mossurize Relatorio Annual, 1925).

So successful were Machazians in using a variety of migrancy tactics to thwart the Companhia's attempts to coercively redirect their labour to internal destinations that by 1930 the Companhia had desisted from its campaign to forcibly recruit labour in the Machaze area. In 1926 the native labour recruitment regime was changed⁴ to preclude the direct intervention of the local administration and replaced by an association that recruited directly for private firms within the Companhia's area on a purely "voluntary" (as opposed to mandatory) basis. The far greater wages paid in South Africa and neighbouring Southern Rhodesia remained far more attractive than any wages paid within the Companhia's borders – such that in 1930 not a single "native" was successfully recruited in Machaze by the new private recruiters (Mossurize Relatorio Annual, 1930: 72–73).

While the Companhia's largely failed efforts to institute a forced labour recruitment system in Machaze contributed to the institutionalization of

international male labour migration in Machazian social life, mine migration also provided new opportunities for younger men to challenge the authority of social seniors and assert their autonomy. Older men had long exerted considerable influence over their sons through the control they exerted over the payment of their sons *lobola* (bridewealth). Labour migration potentially afforded young men with their own source of income for *lobola*. The eldest Machazians (including four octogenarians) interviewed for this study mentioned that in the days of their fathers (the very earliest days of the Companhia at the turn of the century) a man might make only one or two trips to South Africa because of the arduous journey and dangers involved.⁵ However, the development of motorized and rail transportation⁶ within Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, running all the way to the international border, greatly facilitated international labour migration, encouraging a pattern of more continuous circular migration (Letter to the Deputy Administrator of the Companhia de Mocambique from Mr. Alvaro Montez Ribas, May 23, 1938). As migrant men made continuous trips throughout their lifetimes – not merely one or two – paternal control over migrant earnings slowly began to erode, for while a young migrant might turn over his first or even second trips earnings to his father, he was unlikely to do so on subsequent trips.

The intensification of labour migration during the first half of the twentieth century thus increasingly allowed younger migrant men to establish greater autonomy earlier in life. It did so in particular by allowing them to acquire more wives, more quickly – a key route to greater social independence and enhanced status in this polygamous society. A hive-off from a larger co-residential unit (headed by a senior male – such as father) was regarded as more viable and more justifiable if it had more houses (*nhembas*: each loosely based on a wife and her children). Intensified circular migration to work on the mines in South Africa thus provided more and more men the ability to pursue such strategies at an increasingly younger age.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY AND MACHAZIAN LABOUR PARTICIPATION (1945–70)

In the quarter century that followed World War II the profound structural changes in South Africa's economy would re-shape the possibilities for Machazian labour migrants. South Africa's transformation into an industrial society was initiated during the 1930's, accelerating during

and immediately after World War II. During World War II manufacturing overtook both mining and agriculture in contribution to national income (Jones and Muller, 1992: 167). Between 1945 and 1955 the total number of manufacturing establishments in South Africa rose by 47 per cent and the total employment of non-whites in the manufacturing sector rose by 88 per cent (ibid, 175). Between 1937 and 1950 mine wages remained virtually the same whereas wages in manufacturing for blacks almost doubled (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991: 67; Jones and Muller, 1992: 128-131). By 1951 manufacturing wages were twice as high as mine wages (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991: 63). The gap between wages in mining and in manufacturing and construction increased during the 1960's, so that in 1970 mine wages stood at approximately one-third of those paid in these secondary sector activities (Crankshaw, 1997: 98-100). Increasingly higher wages encouraged the indigenous black population of South Africa to eschew mine labour in favor of employment in industrial, manufacturing or service jobs. By 1943 manufacturing had already surpassed mining in the total average number of black labourers employed. Meanwhile the number of black labourers from South Africa participating in mine labour declined from the wartime high of 192,000 in 1941, to 110,654 in 1952 (and had declined even further to 86,399 by 1972) (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991: 62).⁷

The shortfall in South African mine labour would ultimately be made up through an increase in foreign labour recruitment and Mozambique became one of the most important sources during the post-war decades. Yet interestingly, these enhanced opportunities for mine work were not taken up by migrants from Machaze. Instead Machazian choices increasingly reflected the same pattern of the local South African labour force in its shift away from work in the mines to work in the industrial and service sector (Crush, Jeeves, and Yudelman, 1991: 234-235). In reviewing my own life history interviews I found that 62 per cent of all those labour migrants whom I interviewed who were active during the 1940's sought employment in the mines, while only 24 per cent sought employment in the service or manufacturing sector. However, during the fifteen year period between 1962 and 1977, only 38 per cent of my interviewees sought mine employment, while 56 per cent found work outside the mines in either the services or manufacturing sector (Lubkemann, 2000; 2008).

Independent evidence of the shift from mine to non-mine migration among Mozambicans is more generally provided by expressions of colonial alarm at the growing rates at which miners left their jobs prior

to completing their contracts during the post-World War II period. In 1961 the Portuguese Curator of Indigenous Affairs (Curadoria de Negocios Indigenas) in South Africa reported to his counterpart in Beira (Mozambique) a nearly fourfold increase (from 2111 to 7539) in the documented number of such “desertions” between 1948 and 1960.⁸ Less than one-third of the total for this time period of 66,904 were ever “recaptured”.⁹ Indeed a migration strategy that Machazians reported as a popular one – especially for those seeking to make the transition to non-mine employment for the first time was to sign up with WENELA to work in the mines (thus ensuring free transportation and an easier border crossing) only to later desert the WENELA camps in South Africa in order to seek employment in the manufacturing enterprises near the peri-urban townships. As early as 1948 Portuguese officials in Johannesburg reported that “for the clandestine emigrant, it is thus a much easier trip than it was a mere 10 or 15 years ago, given that the WENELA trucks also are used for general passenger transportation, so that the ‘clandestine’ is thus a passenger much like any other” (Curadoria de Negocios Indigenas de Joanesburgo, Relatorio Annual, Uniao de Africa do Sul[Annual Report of the Curator of Indigenous Affairs, Johannesburg Office, Union of Soouth Africa], 1948: 313).

EXPLAINING THE SHIFT: THE ADVANTAGES OF NON-MINE EMPLOYMENT

According to the oral testimony of several long-term Machazian residents in the Vaal area, the first Machazians “crossed-over” from mine employment to alternatives in industry and the service sectors just prior to World War II. One of the most important advantages in non-mine migration was the greater control migrants could exercise over trip duration and timing. Whereas “legal” mine migration was limited to a maximum stay of 18 months, after which a minimum six month rest period in Mozambique was required, employment in the secondary sector could be sustained for much longer periods of time, particularly when Machazians posed as indigenous South Africans. Jobs in industry or service sectors were less regimented and documented than employment in the far more highly regulated and organized mining industry. Unlike mine contracts, most non-mine employment was open-ended and had no pre-set date of termination.

This ability to stay longer in South Africa became increasingly important as migrants from Machaze sought to evade the *chibalo* (forced labour)

regime when it was re-instituted in the circumscription of Mossurize (of which Machaze was a part) in 1942. In this year, the Companhia de Mozambique became the last of the chartered companies to devolve administrative authority over part of Mozambican territory back to the Salazarian dictatorship in Lisbon. The Governor General of Mozambique immediately established a new “Indigenous Labour Code” meant to protect the labour interests of the Portuguese colony by compelling all Africans to prove that they had been “gainfully employed” for at least six months out of the year. An African subject in colonial Mozambique could prove gainful employment either by establishing his status as a “farmer”, as a legal migrant working abroad under the conventions between Portugal and either South Africa or Rhodesia, or as an owner of 50 or more heads of cattle. All those who could not meet these criteria, were obliged under the law to seek paid wage employment within Mozambique, under a contract registered and supervised by the local district administrator’s office (Governo Geral da Colonia de Mocambique, 1947).

Few if any residents of Mossurize district were able to meet the requirements that would have exempted them from this forced labour requirement since the form of subsistence agriculture they practiced did not qualify as “farming” under the new code. “Farming” status required evidence of having planted two entire hectares of crops, of which one half was a commercial cash-crop. However, the prevalence of the tsetse fly in the district rendered the use of both plow animals or herds of cattle untenable.¹⁰ Crop commercialization was also difficult because transportation costs were so prohibitive because of the poor quality of the road network. Consequently in 1960, only 58 men in the entire Mossurize district were listed as agriculturists (Inspeccaco Ordinaria do Distrito de Mossurize, 1960: 53). The international agreement between South Africa and Portugal also prohibited Machazians from any legal participation in mine migration to South Africa, since recruitment was technically only allowed in territories and among populations residing south of the Save river. In 1944 the entire Mossurize district was specifically designated by the governor of Beira (along with Barue and Gorongosa) as a labour reserve for the industrial and agricultural enterprises in the labour-starved Chimoio (Vila Pery) area.

Thus after nearly two decades of respite from forced labour recruitment, Machazian men confronted a new legal dispensation that once again imposed upon them the “legal and moral” obligation” to work within the colony of Mozambique. The effects of this change were drastic, with over 2100 Machazians forcibly recruited to work within the colony in 1942

alone. Recruitment in subsequent years though less effective was nevertheless significant.¹¹

The new forced labour regulation stipulated in extensive detail the rules about the conditions and duration of work which should be guaranteed to the native worker, ranging from transport to and from the location of work, wages, housing, food, clothing, sick leave, contract duration (rigorously six months). Yet throughout the two decades which followed post-Companhia administration both oral testimony and a detailed analysis of the colonial government's own reports and inspections show that these regulations died on the paper on which they were written. The poor treatment of forcibly contracted workers by their Portuguese employers in Vila Pery and in other areas throughout the Beira district emerged early on as a constant theme of official reports without, however, resulting in any noticeable changes – as acknowledged frankly by the colonial inspectors themselves.

As early as 1946, a colonial inspector visiting the Circumscription of Mossurize reported that workers returning from forcibly contracted labour within the colony complained of being given rotten fish as rations and of being forced to work much longer hours than those stipulated in the regulations. The same inspector also commented on the inadequate provision for transporting workers to their destination in Vila Pery, noting that over thirty men were crammed into the back of a small truck without protection from the elements for a two day journey during the rainy season and that over 450 forced recruits had already been transported in this fashion previously (*Inspecção Ordinária de Mossurize*, 1946: 284-286). Six years later little had changed. In a 1952 inspection by the National Directorate of Indigenous affairs violations of the rules governing the conditions for “native workers” were found in every single one of over 20 enterprises visited within the District of Beira. The most consistently identified deficiencies were those of inadequate or overcrowded housing, the use of unpaid minors, work being required from sun up to sundown (instead of the nine hour maximum stipulated in official regulations), and poor food (*Direcção dos Negócios Indígenas, Inspecção de Manica e Mossurize*, 1952: 343-344). The general nature of these abuses throughout the colony continued to be reported by colonial inspectors and administrators throughout the 1950's.¹²

In contrast the conditions in South Africa were more favorable, as reflected in the following account by a migrant returning from South Africa recorded in 1946 by the Mossurize district administrator:

[in South Africa]...the food was very good and was abundant, since they received well-ground flour, meat in abundance and peanuts and beans. In the morning before beginning work they ate meal with sugar and tea or a sweetened drink similar to the *pombe* which they have in their own lands. That they eat at the table with silverware and not by hand as they do in the village. That they do not get hungry when they eat because the work is in shifts and the mealtime is well calculated. that there are many games...and cinema, and places to drink with friends on particular days...and women who around on those specific days (Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize, 1946; Report on Auto da Banja, 1946).

Portuguese colonial administrators also took note of the disparity between the wages in Mozambique and those in South Africa. In 1946, the Governor General Inspector's report on Mossurize district reported that a standard six month contract within the colony provided a monthly salary of 75 escudos, along with 200 additional escudos paid at the end (for the individual taxes). These wages totaled slightly under 8 British pounds at the end of six months – although other administrators also within the same larger District of Beira reported minimum wages that could be as low as 3.5 British pounds for a six month contract (Inspeccao Extraordinaria da Provincia de Manica, 1946: 100). In contrast, recent returnees from South Africa reported a minimum starting pay of 3 British pounds per month, with three interviewees reporting wages as high as 6, 10 and 12 British pounds per month respectively (Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize, 1946; Report on Auto da Banja held with Regulos in Machaze on December 18, 1946: 2). In short, in South Africa earnings were never less than two and a half times those available in Mozambique, and could be up to 25 times higher. Throughout the nearly two decades of forced labour recruitment that followed these significant pay disparities were maintained. In 1958, the Report of the Director of Indigenous Affairs reported that the wages paid by two of the largest private employers of contract labour in the District of Beira, had risen to only 120 escudos per month (1958: 19-21), while during roughly the same time period (1945-1958), the average mine wages in South Africa rose by approximately 30 per cent (Jones and Muller, 1992: 150-155, 256-60; Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991: 60-63).

From the very outset of forced labour's reinstatement in 1942 the African population of Machaze actively resisted the horrific conditions involved. Meeting with the regulos from Machaze and from Espungabera in Mossurize the district administrator in 1946 reported that:

...what they were most frightened of was that thing of contract (i.e. *chibalo*), of which they have genuine horror...their people do not want to go to work in Vila Pery, and throughout the territory the complaints of those who return are widespread, saying that it rains in the camps, that the beans have holes and the flour is spoiled, that meat is only given on few days and in small quantities and that the fish is sometimes rotten and that the employers treat them poorly...(they state) that to be taken from their own homes against their will to make them work is the same thing for them as being imprisoned (*Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize*, 1946; Report on Auto da Banja held with Regulos in Espungabera, 1946).

Much as labour migration to South Africa had proven effective in thwarting the forced labour designs of the Companhia earlier in the century, it once again became a key strategy used by Machazian men to evade the renewed colonial efforts to capture their labour after 1942.¹³ Migrants from Machaze continued to be effective in circumventing the legal statutes that technically prohibited them from seeking employment in South Africa – as colonial authorities themselves were well aware.¹⁴ However, since they remained residents of an area north of the 22nd parallel that had been officially designated as an internal labour reserve, they did not enjoy the legal exemptions from obligatory contract labour that was afforded to mine labourers in areas of Mozambique to the south where recruitment for work in South Africa was legal. Eager to avoid colonial labour recruitment, a growing number of Machazian migrants thus began to shorten the duration of their visits in between employment stints in South Africa. One returnee from South Africa interviewed by the colonial administrator in Machaze in 1946 reported that:

... the horror of contract is so great among some, that upon returning [from South Africa] they do not even enter their own lands because when they arrive at the border they hear that contract recruitment is in process, and that others for the same motive, sleep only one night at home, only to return the next day to the Transvaal (*Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize*, 1946; Report on Auto da Banja held with Regulos in Machaze on December 18, 1946).

Increasingly the fatalism about the rates, level and intensification of this illegal migratory flow that had grown to characterize the reports of the administrators under the Companhia during the first half of the twentieth century also crept into the reports of later Portuguese government colonial administrators. In 1953 one administrator reflected that his 30 years of experience as a colonial official had led him to the

conclusion that this clandestine emigration would simply be impossible to stop (Direccao de Negocios Indigenas, Inspeccoes, Manica and Mossurize, 1953). In 1961 as forced labour recruitment neared its last days in the colony another Mossurize administrator commented:

....we have sought to 'capture' the clandestine without alienating him, because, in reality, it is impossible to maintain a tight vigilance or to impose measures which prevent clandestinity....We are thus of the opinion that what will be accomplished will be so only ever so gradually (Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize, 1960).

GENERATIONAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUGGLES IN THE SHIFT TO NON-MINE EMPLOYMENT

While a concern with evading the colonial state's re-invigorated forced labour project clearly played a role in motivating the shift from mine to non-mine labour, other concerns also drove Machazian migrants from the mines and into manufacturing and service jobs in peri-urban South Africa. The 1926 treaty between the colonial governments in Portugal and South Africa stipulated that a significant portion of wages paid to official mine labourers had to be deferred for payment upon the migrant's return at the end of the contract to Mozambique. A 1964 revision of this agreement established that the amount of deferred pay was to be 60 per cent of the worker's net wage after the first six months (Whiteside and Patel, 1985: 7). By contrast in non-mine employment, wages were paid in full to the migrant in South Africa itself, and often on a weekly (rather than a monthly) basis. This allowed migrants to use as much of that income to purchase items that were sold less expensively in South Africa. With the regularization of motorized bus service within Mozambique (all the way to Machaze by the end of the 1950's) the transportation of larger amounts of merchandise became possible.

Longer periods of employment (along with higher wages) allowed non-mine migrants to potentially earn considerably more money than their counterparts employed in the mines before returning home to Machaze. Many used these earnings to purchase prized "large ticket" items (such as bicycles), and to accumulate more cash and gifts before returning home. The growing demand for consumer items during the late colonial period was commented on by the Mossurize district administrator in his 1962 report under a section entitled "Betterment of the Native Population":

It is pleasing to note the receptiveness manifest in the course of visits throughout their lands, always taking advantage of the opportunities to suggest the need to utilize the benefits of civilization as a vehicle for the creation of necessities, such as the small kerosene lamp, the acquisition of beds and mattresses, clothing and coverings, tables and chairs and clothing above all for women and children. It is curious to note in almost all places visited, something in the manner of the material elevation that is desired, though much is still left to be desired (Relatorio-1o. Trimestre, "Elevacao da populacao indigena", Administracao da Circ. de Mossurize, April 6, 1962).

Greater purchasing power and discretion played an important role in securing greater social autonomy and new forms of leverage in the negotiation of key social relationships for many young migrant men. While the control of cash earnings brought back by migrants could more easily be contested by a senior kinsman on the basis of household "headship" (such as a father), migrants were able to exert more control over the disbursement of goods that they bought in South Africa and brought back to Mozambique. Young migrant men who received the entirety of their wages in South Africa could better control the direct social returns on their wages by bringing back items for specific individuals rather than generic cash. This not only reduced the discretionary power of senior household members over the migrant's earnings, but also created more direct, and less "senior-kin-mediated" forms of social obligation and reciprocity between the migrant – "giver of gifts" – and those within the household or community who received these gifts.

The shift from mine to non-mine migration also accelerated broader processes of local socio-economic differentiation within Machazian society. Whereas most mine workers tended to make and save comparable amounts of money, other forms of employment were more varied in the wages they paid. The most successful earners could potentially bring back far more money and goods than migrants who engaged in the normal 12-18 month cycles of mine contracts. This difference in earnings was amplified further by the ability of non-mine labourers to purchase consumer items at lower prices in South Africa than were available for purchase in Machaze with deferred wages paid back in Mozambique to miners. However, those working outside of the mines could also fare far worse than those employed in the mines. Whereas the mine labour pay system deferred a considerable amount of total earnings for payment at the border upon return into Mozambique, non-mine migrants who were paid in full in South Africa confronted specific risks – and sometimes

made choices – that thwarted their ability to accumulate savings. Not only was theft a common problem for those migrants living in hostels or townships, but they had far greater opportunity than did miners to spend (rather than save) all of their money.

Thus, while migrants were attracted to new migration options because of the greater power and autonomy they afforded, they also had to confront rising levels of social conflict that were generated by the growing socio-economic differentiation and the shifting balance of power in Machazian social relations effected by this shift in migration. These new forms and levels of social conflict in turn generated their own motives for making particular migratory choices. Many of the migrants whose life histories I collected explained that they left the mines and sought other forms of employment in order to avoid “social problems” with other kin within their extended households that threatened to generate witchcraft (*uloi*). Machazians believed that social interaction occurred not only among the living but also between the living and the spirits of the dead. Among Machazians, as among many other Shona-speakers (Bourdillon, 1991), all serious illnesses, misfortune, and death were attributed to *uloi*. In fact, the mere existence of feelings of ill will between social actors was believed to motivate spirits to act.¹⁵ According to many migrants, employment outside of the mines was more effective in preventing *uloi* because it allowed a migrant to work in locations that could more easily be kept “unknown” from family members-and thus presumably from ancestral or other spirits “sent” to disturb them (Lubkemann, 2008: 93-100).

APARTHEID AND NEW CONJUGAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PERI-URBAN SOUTH AFRICA

Perhaps the most important social change that resulted from greater Machazian participation in non-mine migration stemmed from the new conjugal opportunities that emerged from the need for those in non-mine employment to find housing in South Africa. Following earlier legislation in the 1920s and 1930s that established the general principles of residential segregation and white employment privilege in South Africa, a comprehensive pass control system was created through the natives Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945 and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1952. According to these laws all South African blacks could only be employed in “white” urban areas for a period of one year at a time, after which they were required to return to their assigned

“homelands” to register for a new contract. The only exceptions were those given so called “section 10” rights.¹⁶

Although the new housing policies and labour legislation presented obstacles to black urbanization, this legislation ultimately failed thoroughly in preventing urbanization from increasing on a massive scale throughout the 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s. The higher wages available in manufacturing and in services in the urban areas continued to attract a steady stream of black migrants into the urban areas, at the same time that the heightening of rural poverty in the bantustans drove them out. Under these apartheid policies, one of the major challenges that Machazians faced in the Vaal area involved housing. Unlike the mines where compound housing was provided, housing for employment in urban areas had to be obtained privately. Up through the early 1950s some industrial employers such as ESCOM had legal compounds very similar to those on the mines. Yet for most men it became necessary to find accommodation in hostels or elsewhere within the townships. By the early 1950s, a number of Machazians were able to obtain housing in Sharpeville and “pass” as section 10 black South Africans, having already obtained South African identity papers. The fact that only a minority of Machazian men obtained section 10 status did not prevent a growing number of these migrants from building homes in the rapidly growing peri-urban townships. Much like most South African residents in the townships during this time, the homes they built were technically illegal, but in practice tolerated by authorities who, deferring to the demand for labour and overwhelmed by the magnitude of the population influx, simply looked the other way.

Township residence generated new social opportunities South Africa for Machazian men that had not been as readily available within the more controlled and regulated social environment of the mines. Residents in mine compounds had limited contact with women – usually involving brief liaisons with prostitutes. In contrast, residence in the townships offered much greater opportunities for a variety of forms of conjugal union with South African women.¹⁷ The influx of South African women into the urban areas during this time period also increasingly improved the “conjugal market” in terms of potential conjugal partners for men from Machaze. Whereas in 1950 women were estimated to comprise less than 30 per cent of South Africa’s urban and peri-urban population, by 1980 they were reported to comprise 45 per cent of the urban population, and in some places such as in Soweto, to have reached virtual parity with the male population (Smits, 1985: 11-117). Men from Machaze

offered several benefits to this flood of urbanizing South African women over South African men. Their employment, albeit at a lower wage level, provided a guarantee of resources which many unemployed urban black South Africans did not provide. Men from Machaze also had fewer family members who might make demands on these women. Since many of these women lacked kinship networks in urban areas, the similar status of Machazian men provided women with a greater degree of power in cases of social disputes than might have been afforded by unions with South African men.

Among all Machazian men that I interviewed who had been migrants in South Africa prior to Mozambique's civil war (1979), a progression in some form of "durable conjugal union" with South African women was clearly noticeable over time. Whereas only 10 per cent of those migrating to South Africa during the 1940's (N = 21) reported being involved in a relationship with a South African woman during that decade, over 33 per cent of those migrating between 1962 and 1978 (N = 52) reported involvement in such relationships. Still—by most accounts, the majority of these unions still had limited durability (often one trip) and contrasted with the more permanent conjugal unions that Mozambican migrants pursued with woman back in Machaze.

However, by the early 1970s a handful of Machazian migrants had begun to experiment with new social possibilities by consolidating conjugal unions in South Africa that were increasingly similar to those they enjoyed back in Machaze. The following ethnographic account of "Mutisse" – a Machazian whose migrant career spanned the period from the early 1950s through the mid-1970s – is illustrative of the gradual evolution in the social obligations and expectations that characterized the South African-based relationships of such "conjugal entrepreneurs":

...on my first two trips I never thought about a South African woman. On the first trip I lived in a company compound....on the second one in a hostel...I also lived in a hostel on the third trip but during that time I had to go often into Vereeniging and I kept seeing this Xhosa woman who was working as a domestic... we eventually were together but she lived at her employers house and I lived in the hostel. But she would sometimes wash my clothes and make food. I sometimes gave her some money to help with her expenses.... I did not see her after I came back on the next trip from Machaze but I also got a job that trip a domestic and I came to know and be with another Xhosa woman who was the domestic next door. We had a child and I supported her for some time but we had disagreements...no I did not pay lobola... Later after we

separated I met a Zulu woman who was working at a supermarket in Van der Bijl. Although we lived separately we spent a lot of time together and when she had the child I decided to pay lobola... At that time (1963) I did not plan to come back to Mozambique again. It was very expensive and after I had paid half she left and when I tried to pursue her brothers beat me very badly... I went back to Mozambique and was married later that same year... After my wife in Machaze was pregnant I returned here to Sebokeng... Later I met a Shangaana woman and she also had a child... I moved to Sebokeng in 1967 so we could have a house together... I only returned again to Machaze in 1970 and then again right before the Portuguese left which I saw [in 1975].

While some migrant men seemed to be augmenting their social investments in South Africa during the late colonial period this did not necessarily mean that they sought to sever their connections to wives or reduce their ties to Machaze. A handful of social entrepreneurs interested in maintaining social ties and pursuing economic opportunities simultaneously in Mozambique and South Africa began to experiment with what in effect was a new form of conjugal model that I have elsewhere termed “transnational polygyny” (Lubkemann, 2000c, 2008).

Migrant interest in retaining ties to Machaze despite new social options in South Africa may be explained in part by the new economic opportunities that emerged in Machaze during the last fifteen years of Portuguese colonial rule and by the abolishment of forced contract labour in 1962.¹⁸ Both the anti-colonial war and the massive influx of white Portuguese *colonos* (settlers) during the 1960s and early 1970s stimulated the growth of the Mozambican economy enormously.¹⁹ Machaze specifically benefited from a number of significant infrastructural developments that resulted from the colonial war effort against FRELIMO after 1964.²⁰ Between 1958 and 1967 a network of permanent diesel-powered water boreholes and storage tanks were drilled by the colonial authorities at strategic locations in the district, along the improved dirt road network (Relatorio Sobre a Elevacao da Populacao Nativa, Circunscricao de Mossurize 3o Trimestre, 1965 [Report on the Improvement of the Native population, Mossurize Circumscription, 3rd Trimester]; Referencia a Nota Confidencial No52/72 de 2/6/1972, do Chefe do gabinete Distrital de APSIC de Vila Pery, 24 de Julho de 1972 [memo in Reference to Confidential Note No 52/72 of 2/6/1972 by the District Chief of APSIC in Vila Pert, 24th of July 1972]) During the 1960s, bus service from Machaze to the border posts was also regularized. Some return migrants began to use these transportation services to engage in their own commercial trade ventures, responding to rising demand within the

district for consumer items. Improved transportation services also began to make the modest commercialization of agricultural produce a possibility for the first time. The number of commercial establishments in Machaze which had been limited under the Companhia's tenure to the solitary presence of the Indian merchant Omar & Ca. expanded to include at least seven permanent shops by 1962 (Monografia Psicossocial, Posto de Machaze, 1962).

The lack of settler presence in Machaze²¹ was also important in allowing Machazians to benefit from the colony's economic boom without suffering the disenfranchisement that accompanied settler arrival in many other areas in Mozambique. Machazians experienced none of the large land appropriations connected to agricultural *colonato* schemes to the south in Chokwe, or to the north in Sussundenga, and along the Manica-Beira corridor (Chingono, 1996; Pitcher, 1995; Alexander, 1994; Couvane, 2001). They also were able to participate in the development of petty trade and services – a domain of economic activity that was not as accessible to local African participation in other areas that had a higher concentration of settlers. By the mid-1960s a number of Machazian innovators had invested in small *tuck* (convenience) shops and grinding mill businesses back in the district (Relatorio Sobre a Elevacao da Populacao Nativa, Circunscricao de Mossurize 3o Trimestre, 1965), while others sold poultry or ran motorized transportation services to large Mozambican cities such as Beira and Vila Pery (Monografia Psicossocial, Posto de Machaze, 1962: 8). In all these cases, South African migration provided the means for the accumulation the capital needed for launching small businesses or transnational petty-trading ventures.

PROLONGED WARTIME DISPLACEMENT AND SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL OPTIONS (1977–1992):

Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1974 and its precipitous descent into a fifteen year civil war shortly thereafter (starting in 1977) initially gave new vigor and impetus to international migration –and ultimately effected profound transformations in Machazian social organization and in the migration regime itself. Shortly after Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, hostile neighbouring apartheid regimes instigated a civil war that lasted almost fifteen years. Machaze was one of the earliest settings for this conflict. By late 1979 the area was fully embroiled in the war between the Rhodesian (and later South African) supported anti-government faction (RENAMO)

and the government forces (FRELIMO). Estimates suggest that between 40 per cent and 70 per cent of the population left the district to South Africa, Zimbabwe, or other internal destinations within Mozambique during the conflict (GTZ, 1993, 1996; CARE 1994; Wenzel and Bannerman, 1995). These wartime movements were patterned in highly gender-specific ways: throughout the war almost twice as many women as men remained in Machaze or in neighbouring rural districts (GTZ, 1993, 1996; CARE International, 1994; Lubkemann, 2000a). By contrast during the first years of the conflict, most adult Machazian men migrated to the peri-urban areas in South Africa.

At the outset of the conflict, the decisions by men to migrate to South Africa – in many cases to avoid involuntary recruitment into armed service with either side – represented the continuation of long-established coping strategies employed during the previous cycles of intensified colonial labour recruitment that had been experienced periodically throughout the previous century. The flight of men to South Africa during the beginning of the Mozambican civil war thus reproduced historically established models for dealing with coercive political authority.

However, if initial gendered patterns of the Machazian population's wartime demographic distribution reflected an attempt to adjust pre-war socio-economic strategies to the heightened dangers and new problems of a wartime environment, wartime migration eventually came to be shaped by other factors as well. By 1983, when the war was aggressively spreading into other areas of the country for the first time (such as Cabo Delgado and parts of Zambezia and Niassa provinces), it had already raged in Machaze for half a decade. As the war dragged on year after year it became less and less possible for Machazians to treat the new problems and opportunities that the conflict presented as temporary factors in the calculation, imagination, and implementation of their life-strategies. As the situation in the district deteriorated as a result of the combined scourges of drought (1981–1982) and mounting violence, a growing number of migrant men in South Africa sought to assist wives, children, parents, and other family members to relocate out of the district altogether. A number of these men went to extraordinary lengths, returning repeatedly into Mozambique to assist wives and children to relocate into safer areas.

After the establishment of the first official UNHCR camp in Zimbabwe (1984), a number of Machazian men who were living in South Africa encouraged spouses and other family members to relocate into these

camps. Some sent money and others actually returned to assist in making this move before proceeding back to their areas of employment in South Africa. After returning to South Africa many of these men – such as Jereboamo²² – continued to send money or other forms of support and to maintain communication with their family members in these “surrogate home bases”:

When I learned that my family (a wife, three children, his mother and father, and a niece) was staying near Chipinge. Their life was very very hard because they had no machaamba. This little brother was just sitting (indicating he was unemployed) so I told him to take 40 Rand and some tea and sugar back to my father and to take them to Tongogara (the younger brother had been in the camp before). Then he should send word so I could send for him again...I could not go because of my job so I sent him. This is what he did three times again before he opened this tuck shop...On the last trip he brought back my sister's son.

Yet, despite growing concern, prolonged separations, and willingness to assist family members in Mozambique to relocate to Zimbabwe, very few of these men made any efforts to bring their families to come live with them in the townships of South Africa. While older sons were sometimes sent for by their fathers in South Africa, the vast majority of these men were highly resistant to the idea of others – and most particularly their spouses – joining them in South Africa. Many men argued that a Machazian wife would become a dependent who would only drain their earnings because they would be unable to practice subsistence agriculture as they had back in Machaze. The townships in the Vaal region in which many Machazian men had resettled consisted of small houses and shacks sprawling from horizon to horizon, each with tiny yards generally covering less than ten square meters. Even small garden plots and the domestic animals such as chickens that were so ubiquitous in Machaze were rarely seen since these were likely to be stolen. As one man remarked:

What could she (my Machazian wife) do here except ‘eat my money’? There is nowhere (here in the township) to plant a *maachamba*. She could not sell fruit because she does not know the language or the Rand (the South African currency)... Even to cook here you must have money. You must buy charcoal and parafin... It is not like Machaze where she can go and find firewood snap snap...

The notion that Machazian women would have inevitably become an economic burden in South Africa is somewhat questionable. Migrant

women to South African township areas have been shown by a considerable body of research to be quite successful participants in the flourishing informal economy in these areas (e.g. Bozzoli, 1991a, 1991b; Preston-Whyte, 1991) – as I also found to be the case for those few Machazian women who did eventually join spouses in South Africa during the war (Lubkemann, 2000a: 417-419).²³ Probably of far greater economic importance to men in South Africa was the effect that a wife's continued presence in Zimbabwe had on deterring other dependent family members from joining them in South Africa (such as small children and aged parents, all of whom were often living with a spouse in the UNHCR camps or elsewhere in Zimbabwe or Mozambique). The arrival of such dependents could strain migrant income. Using humanitarian aid in the camps as a substitute for much of what subsistence agriculture in Machaze had provided, Machazian men thus sought to adapt household subsistence strategies rather than undertake the much more dramatic re-organization of domestic socio-economic relations that would have been resulted from their wives joining them in South Africa.

However Machazian men also had other reasons for not wanting their wives to join them in South Africa. Throughout the twentieth century Machazian men's life strategies have depended on rather acute culturally prescribed asymmetries in gender relations that allow them to exploit women's labour for their own benefit. Many men feared that Machazian women who migrated to South Africa might become less willing to accept long-established gendered divisions of labour, power, and authority that defined social roles within Machazian marriages and households. In Machaze, poor land quality and acute water scarcity make domestic and agricultural tasks highly labour intensive. Women perform most of these labour-intensive tasks. For example the average woman walks several kilometers per day to get water and usually performs the most onerous and labour-intensive agricultural tasks.

Machazian men's gendered monopoly on (migration-based) sources of cash played an important role in their ability to maintain control women's labour by fostering female dependency on men (for cash). Thus, paradoxically some of the very same men who in one conversation claimed their wives would have represented an economic burden, often also expressed fears that if Machazian women came to South Africa they might gain too much independence as a result of economic success:

When the woman from Machaze comes she does not know about money but she must learn with the other women selling some fruits on

the street. At first she will give this money to her husband. But then she will see that the other women are wearing dresses instead of capulanas and eating cakes...Then maybe she will start to eat the money she earns (instead of giving it to her husband)...

Many Machazian quite explicitly highlighted keeping Machazian women unaware of “customs” that might prompt them to question the patriarchal privileges to which most Machazian men aspired. As one man put it:

A woman (from Machaze) who comes here will lose her custom because the ways are different here. When she goes back to Machaze then how will she walk so far for water?... She will want mealies that are fine fine (finely ground)...

However, if Machazian men were concerned with protecting gendered prerogatives, many also avoided bringing their Mozambican wives and families to join them during the war in order to take advantage of new conjugal opportunities in South Africa itself. While only a handful of social entrepreneurs had seriously considered establishing permanent households and marriages in South Africa before the war, this option became increasingly attractive as the war dragged on for year after year with no end in sight. A growing number of Machazian men began to consider the possibility that they might never be able to reclaim or resume their lives back in Mozambique:

At first I did not think about the war so much. I did not visit Machaze because it was too “hot” there. Some went back but never returned so I was afraid to go because I could be killed. Later I heard that my father had been killed but I did not hear about my mother or my wife so I thought they were dead too. I started to think that the situation in Mozambique would be too hot because FRELIMO and RENAMO never wanted to stop fighting even after President Samora was killed. So I said this war will not stop – I must stay in this place.

For many, the war had disrupted their contact with some or even all their family members back in Mozambique. Even among those who maintained contact with wives and other relatives relocated to UNHCR camps or other safe areas, there was growing recognition that life-strategies that continued to count heavily on Mozambican social options were less than secure. Consequently the possibility of developing alternative strategies for realizing their own life-course strategies through conjugal relationships with South African women proved an increasingly attractive possibility.

However, the presence of a Machazian spouse in South Africa would have made such strategies less viable. Machazian men were well aware that the majority of South African women were not receptive to polygyny in general and were adamantly opposed in particular to the presence of a Mozambican wife in their homes. Consequently, marriages with South African women were dependent on maintaining secrecy about the existence of any simultaneous marital partners elsewhere.

It became even more important for these men to conceal their Mozambican identity once the South African government issued an expulsion order for all Mozambican migrant workers, even those legally recruited, in 1986 (ILO, 1988), effectively making all Mozambicans who remained in South Africa into illegal migrants. Increasingly Mozambicans men thus sought to conceal their nationality of origin even from South African spouses, most often by claiming to be Shangaanas from the Giyani area in South Africa (much as they did with South African authorities). In order to successfully pull off this strategy of “passing” as South African Shangaanas, Machazian men generally chose non-Shangaana spouses – in particular Xhosa women – precisely because they were not knowledgeable enough of the Shangaana language or cultural practices to be able to detect their husband’s foreign origin. Of course, identity management of this sort would become virtually impossible should a Machazian women came to reside with them in South Africa.

Many men also feared that their Machazian wives would become discontent at the discovery of South African counterparts and that contention (and the inevitable by-product of *uloi*) would likely arise from disputes over who had more authority in the household.

As the Mozambican civil war progressed, Machazian migrant men in South Africa consequently went to considerable lengths to prevent Machazian wives from joining them. Some men refused to respond to letters from spouses who requested assistance that would allow them to join their husbands in South Africa, sometimes under the pretext that they had never received these letters in the first place. Some promised indefinitely delayed assistance, while others provided spouses with more misleading reasons why they should not come to South Africa:

Initially I wrote back (to his wife in the UNHCR camp) that it was not possible for her to come here because I was living in a hostel and women were not allowed. After I bought this house I continued to say I was living in the (single sex) hostel so she would not come.²⁴

FROM WARTIME DISPLACEMENT BACK TO (TRANSFORMED) LABOUR MIGRATION: THE POST-CONFLICT GROWTH OF TRANSNATIONAL POLYGyny

Although the Mozambican civil war was brought to an end in late 1992 and the international community invested massively in repatriation efforts – not least of all in an effort to definitively repatriate Mozambicans who had settled in South Africa (Dolan, 1999; Lubkemann, 2008) – Machazian men's investment in transnational polygyny and South African options grew significantly during the first post-war decade. Although many men were eager to re-establish social ties back in Mozambique with their kin who had remained in Mozambique during the conflict or who had been repatriated from UNHCR camps in Zimbabwe after it, many of these same men also had reservations about whether the peace would “stick” and few had any confidence in either of the political parties. While most Machazians in South Africa were highly mistrustful of FRELIMO, many were equally reluctant to see RENAMO gain power.

Moreover, the economic situation in Mozambique – particularly in Machaze – seemed unpromising to those who returned in search of relatives and in order to assess the situation. During my initial fieldwork in the Vaal (South Africa) (five years after the war had ended), tales of failed efforts to successfully return and invest “back home” circulated widely within the Machazian community and continued unabated throughout my subsequent annual shorter-term visits over the five years that followed. Throughout the decade that followed the peace accords, a few Machazian migrants expressed an interest in engaging in petty trade back in Mozambique by reselling items brought from South Africa and Zimbabwe in Machaze. Yet almost none sought to make the types of more permanent (and taxable) investments, such as in grinding mills and boreholes, that had served as the model to emulate during the last decade of the colonial period.

Although Machaze enjoyed some infrastructural improvements after the war (three health posts, several schools, the rehabilitation of boreholes in some of the former *aldeias comunais*{*communal villages*}), the bulk of reconstruction assistance in Manica province remained focused on the provincial capital (Chimoio) far to the north and along the corridor between the Zimbabwean border and the coastal city of Beira. The rehabilitation of the two major roads running through the district undertaken in the first five years after the war proved to be measures insufficient against the ravages

of the rainy season that rendered them virtually impassable for months at a time. The first post-war decade also generated very few employment options in Machaze itself. Thus most men who did re-establish ties in Mozambique after the war, soon realized that migration to South Africa for employment was still their best – perhaps even only – earning option.

If permanent return to Machaze posed considerable risks, political and economic developments in South Africa also left many migrants apprehensive about their future possibilities in the townships. Throughout the 1990s South Africa suffered from growing rates of unemployment as it emerged from over a decade of isolation that had paradoxically protected many of its industries from international competition. Jobs became much harder for Machazians to find. The Vaal area – long the target area for most Machazian labour migrants – underwent a particularly profound recession throughout the 1990s. The large industries such as ISCOR (the South African Steel Conglomerate) that had dominated the economic landscape for decades began to cut jobs. Some of the largest employers, such as VECOR and Stewarts and Lloyds, closed their doors for the last time in the early 1990s. Whereas tales of unemployment were rare when discussing migratory careers before the war, by 1997 a majority of Machazian men of all ages in South Africa were unemployed – some for months or even years at a time.

Increasingly these men turned to the same informal sector activities that many South Africans pursued in order to survive. In the late 1990s, hundreds of small “tuck shops” dotted the sprawling Vaal townships in which Machazians lived, often located merely three or four houses apart. Many were no more than an additional room built onto a small house or shack, with a latch-and-lock window. Everyday items such as oil, bread, canned goods, matches, cookies, paraffin, and eggs were bought at the hypermarkets in town and then resold in the townships for miniscule gains. Relatively easy to start because of the low capital required, most eventually failed in the face of low profit margins, stiff competition, and rising crime. Many criminals targeted establishments owned by foreigners, knowing they were far less likely to report crimes because they feared deportation. These mounting challenges in South Africa after the war motivated a growing number of men to seek ways in which to keep options open in Mozambique – especially as the peace did begin to appear to consolidate.

In short, post-war Mozambique and post-apartheid South Africa each presented Machazian men with a different set of challenges,

uncertainties, and opportunities. By and large Machazian men reacted to these risks by attempting to pursue a strategy of social and economic investment in both countries simultaneously – thus diversifying their risks. Ultimately, a growing number of these men no longer saw Machaze as the only place in which to constitute families and establish a permanent residence. Rather than viewing South Africa as merely a place for “temporary employment”, the townships increasingly became a site of social investment equal in importance to Machaze itself. Thus, while 89 per cent of the 200 Machazian men that I surveyed²⁵ in South Africa in 1997 planned to eventually “return” Machaze, 79 per cent also planned to keep a house in South Africa as well.

Many had strong economic motives for maintaining a presence in South Africa: 47 per cent of the men surveyed reported that they were enrolled in a pension plan (through their employers) that could only be collected in South Africa. Just under three quarters of these men (72%) planned to maintain some form of business venture in South Africa, even if they re-established a home back in Mozambique. A majority of these men had secured the identity documents that allowed them to “pass” as South Africans. Just under 65 per cent had legal South African identity documents – which they had obtained either through bribing officials or misrepresenting themselves as South Africans – while another 19 per cent had forged South African identity documents.

Transnational polygyny afforded the ideal mechanism for simultaneously pursuing and protecting socio-economic options in both South Africa and in Mozambique at the same time. In my 1997 survey I thus found that 23 per cent of the respondents had spouses who lived only in Mozambique; and another 26 per cent had spouses who lived only in South Africa; however 37 per cent were involved in conjugal relations in both South Africa and Mozambique at the same time. Another 2 per cent were actually involved in conjugal relations in three countries at the same time (South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) (Lubkemann, 2000a: 448-449).

Some of these men developed the “transnational polygyny strategy” to an extreme. One man (who I will call “Felipe”) who I interviewed several times starting in 1996 had four wives living in three different countries. Two of his wives lived in Machaze, another lived in South Africa, and a fourth one lived in Zimbabwe. His fifth wife in Chimoio had passed earlier in the year before realizing her own return to Machaze. In Machaze his two wives each tended *maachambas* [cultivated fields] and one son ran a small “tuck shop” with products Felipe occasionally sent

back from South Africa where he worked in construction. In Zimbabwe his third wife traded in the market while living with one of his sons who made and sold stone carvings to tourists. Meanwhile in South Africa, he shared his house with the Xhosa woman (and their three children) who had never been to Mozambique and was employed as a part-time domestic worker. Two other sons also lived in South Africa, the younger one tending their small “tuck shop” in Sebokeng.

In the wake of wartime displacement, men such as Felipe had clearly reconfigured their lives in ways that envisioned continued social investment in both Machaze and in South Africa after the war ended. To “return” to Machaze for these men was thus no longer a matter of “leaving” South Africa. Arguably, for a growing number of such men, wartime displacement had transformed the meaning and uses of migration altogether.²⁶ Increasingly, in the post-conflict context, international migration no longer operated as a strategy for procuring resources in one place (South Africa) in order to pursue social reproduction in another (Mozambique). Rather migration became the indispensable mechanism through which these men inhabit and enact a new transnational form of lifescape (Lubkemann, 2008). As transnationality has become their “locality”, the capacity for mobility has become its defining – and requisite – characteristic. At the same time, the extent of transnational social and economic investments by these men raises deeper analytical questions about the very meaning of the term “migrant” itself and whether the temporariness and asymmetries of attachment that tend to implicitly convey with that term meaningfully apply to such cases. In what sense are Mozambican men in South Africa ultimately “Mozambican migrants”, rather than merely South African residents who – in some cases – migrate only temporarily to Mozambique?

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, international migration in Machaze has continuously and dynamically been “re-situated” throughout the twentieth century as a strategy simultaneously and irreducibly implicated in a complex array of interrelated social and political struggles occurring simultaneously at various levels. In Machaze, migration has been a strategy formulated and deployed not only to resist the pretensions of an enfeebled colonial state or to cope with the violence of war, but also – and at the same time – for re-negotiating the authority of elders, consolidating gendered power, and even resolving threats and concerns grounded in local beliefs

about witchcraft. Through migration, Machazians have thus contended with state authority and wartime violence, responded to wage disparities, and also sought to recalibrate their position in local social relations and even redefine the terms of those relations themselves. Machazian migration regimes have in turn been dramatically re-shaped by the conduct of these struggles themselves.

Arguably any effort to make generalizations about the specific effects (on migration regimes) of the confluence of local social struggles with broader political-economic trends will inevitably fall short in a country with such remarkable ethno-cultural and socio-economic diversity as Mozambique, and throughout which the weight and forms of colonial intervention and the violence of civil war were so unevenly felt (see Lubkemann, 2005a; Lubkemann and Garvey, forthcoming). However, the Machazian case arguably models broader truths that bear highlighting in the study of Mozambican migration as a whole and in similar contexts where wartime displacement occurs in a setting in which labour migration has long played a central role in the organization of social and economic relations. Most notably, the Machazian case highlights the need to investigate the relationships between labour and forced migration in such contexts, rather than treating these forms of migrancy a-priori as categorically distinct. It also indicates the usefulness of understanding migration as a strategy that is always implicated in complex and multivalent strategies of social navigation (Utas, 2005) that are not merely reactions to broader political-economic processes (colonialism, apartheid, war) but are also shaped by the terms of local forms of social struggle (gender, generational) that have their own culturally-specific social contours.

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NOTES

1. Fieldwork was conducted for this study between 1995 and 1999 with Mozambicans who originated from the south-central district of Machaze (in Manica province) before the Mozambican civil war, but who resided in in

three different locations after the conflict, namely: those who had fled to a peri-urban township in the Vaal region of South Africa; those who had moved internally to the provincial capital, Chimoio; and those who had remained in (or returned to) the district of origin (Machaze) itself. Research methods in this study included informal interviews, participant observation, over 120 extensive oral life history interviews, several surveys (including the three drawn upon in this study), and review of over 400 district- or sub-district-level reports (including annual, census, and a variety of occasional reports) dating from 1898–1995. The documentation reviewed was made available through the generosity of the Arquivo Historico de Mocambique in Maputo, Mozambique.

2. The concession granted to the Companhia de Mocambique guaranteed its rights to native labour, effectively making it illegal for those living within the Companhia's territory to be recruited for labour across international borders—a legal statute reinforced by the conventions signed between the Portuguese colonial government and South Africa successively in 1913, 1923, and 1928 that prohibited the Witswatersrand Native Labor Association (WENELA) from recruiting north of the 22nd parallel (Couvane, 1989—specifically see pages 60 and 83)
3. For more on this, see *Relatorio Sobre Prisao de Engajadores e Apprensao de Burros*- Administrador of Mossurize to Governor of the Companhia de Mocambique Territory, January 27, 1909; *Relatorio Sobre Engajadores Junto a Fronteira*- Administrador of sub-posto of Massangena to Governor of the Companhia de Mocambique Territory, November 15, 1912; *Relatorio Sobre Emigracao Clandestina de Indigena*-Administrador of Mossurize to Governor of the Companhia de Mocambique Territory, May 22, 1912; Letter to the Deputy Administrator of the Companhia de Mozambique from Mr. Alvaro Montez Ribas, May 23, 1938.
4. Order 8:087 of August 3, 1926 of the Governor of the Territory of the Companhia de Mocambique. This order abolished the *Reparticao de Trabalho Indigena*, RTI (Native Labour Section) of the companhia that by decree 1:303 of December 22, 1914 had been given the charge of labour recruitment. The acquisition of native labour thus no longer became a function of government. The RTI was replaced by the *Associacao do Trabalho Indigena de Manica and Sofala* (commonly known as the ATI), an actual corporation formed by (European) merchants, industrialists and agricultural landowners in the Companhia's territory and given a monopoly on the voluntary recruitment of native labour. Order 5:133 of September 1926 entirely prohibited any forced recruitment of native labour for private ends/businesses. The district administrators under this new regime no longer held the role of labour recruiter, but as agents of the Directorate of Native Affairs were given the responsibility of exercising a “meticulous vigilance over recruitment and native labour, and the indispensable tutelage over workers and an intense propaganda promoting voluntary labour” *Apontamentos a Monografia do Indigena, Governo da Companhia de Mocambique, Direccao dos Negocios Indigenas*, 1930.

5. Historian Patrick Harries has documented the high fatality rate and difficulties of early Mozambican labour migration to the South African mines around the turn of the century (Harries, 1994).
6. The development of such transportation systems was viewed with chagrin and outright alarm by the Companhia's administrators who were well aware of what for them was a significant problem albeit one against which they took only fitful, and largely ineffective countermeasures (Relatorio Sobre Engajadores Junto a Fronteira- Administrador of sub-posto of Massangena to Governor of the Companhia de Mocambique Territory, November 15, 1912; Relatorio Sobre Emigracao Clandestina de Indigena-Administrador of Mossurize to Governor of the Companhia de Mocambique Territory, May 22, 1912; Letter to the Deputy Administrator of the Companhia de Mozambique from Mr. Alvaro Montez Ribas, May 23, 1938).
7. Meanwhile the average number of black labourers employed in industries other than mining or agriculture rose from 200,000 in 1944 to over 430,000 in 1955, and subsequently reached 653,000 in 1970 and 1, 308,000 by 1975 (Jones and Muller, 1992: 278).
8. The number of such recorded "desertions per year between 1948 and 1960 were as follows: 1948-2111; 1949-2512; 1950-2651; 1951-4057; 1952-4075; 1953-4753; 1954-6814; 1955-6300; 1956-6608; 1957-6736; 1958-577; 1959-6977; 1960-7539 (Curadoria de Negocios Indigenas, Manica e Sofala , Relatorio Annual, 1961)
9. Notably these figures did not include those who fled after concluding their 18 months of service because their number was stated to be "unknown but presumed to be high".
10. In the district inspector's report in 1946 Machaze is described as a "true den for this fly" (document 13, 1946, 137). In the 1946 annual meeting with the local district administrator, the regulos in Mossurize were asked why most men continued to migrate illegally to South Africa leaving their families behind rather than cultivating corn as a cash crop. They responded as follows: "...that some had already considered this option, but that they could not cultivate the land with plows because the ox dies with the 'sleeping fly', and that having next purchases donkeys to plow with instead, these had also dies, so that cultivation remained impossible." (Inspeccao Ordinaria de Mossurize, 1946; Report on Auto da Banja held with Regulos in Espungabera on December 21, 1946, 2)
11. Labourers reported as recruited within the Circumscription in the subsequent fifteen years are as follows: 1943-992; 1944-1190; 1945-1317; 1946-1110; 1947-798; 1948-1416; 1949-1573; 1950-1657; 1951-1806; 1952-unavailable; 1953-unavailable; 1954-1244; 1955-1837; 1952-1295; 1957-2615; 1958-2316; (data compiled from the following: Mossurize, Relatorios Annuais 1942, 1944, 1950, 1951; "Mapa de Mao de Obra Recrutada na Circ. De Mossurize 1943-44" Espungabera, Camilo Ferreira de Almeida, July 6, 1945, Relatorio do Director dos Servicos dos Negocios Indigenas, Curadoria Geral, 1958.)
12. In 1953 the Annual Report of the National Directorate of Indigenous Affairs concluded that: "... it can be affirmed, with certainty of not being falsified, that each employer acts according to their own criterion. He

establishes the work schedule, the times when workers may rest or eat, and the duration and regime of overtime.....the idea for the (legal regime) was to establish absolute maximum (hours) admissible, prohibiting consequently anything beyond these maximums because to proceed beyond such maximums would be inhuman and put the health of the native at risk(emphasis in the original). Unfortunately , it must be acknowledged, that despite this absolute mandate, that cases of work which violate these limits are not rare in this Province.”(Curadoria Geral dos Indigenas a Direccao dos Servicos de Negocios Indigenas de Mocambique, Relatorio Annual 1953, 66-69). Again in 1958 the Curator General reported little progress in the treatment of chibalo workers 1958 despite decades of official reports condemning the same abuses and a flurry of decrees and regulations instituted to curb them: “...unfortunately it is no easy task to impose its observation, despite the Code of Indigenous Labor’s having been published over three decades ago...As a general rule employers offer the greatest possible resistance to the establishment of just salaries; they remain entirely uninterested in attracting and holding the interest of the labour they need; they cannot be cured of their use of recruitment, limiting themselves to paying the amounts which recruiters demand of them;...they do not construct camps and habitations for workers unless compelled to do so; they avoid providing adequate medical care and distribute the worst quality clothing that is permitted.. (Relatorio do director dos Servicos dos Negocios Indigenas, Curadoria Geral, 1958, 14).

13. Even more so than had been the case under the Companhia de Mocambique the Portuguese colonial state sought to co-opt local traditional authorities in their efforts to recruit local labour. I have discussed the largely limited success of Portuguese authorities in this effort in Machaze more extensively in Lubkemann 2008; 96-99). However, even though limited in its success the greater involvement of traditional authorities did increase the pressure to migrate abroad in order to avoid being identified for internal recruitment by a local chief.
14. “a part of the natives of Mossurize and other circumscription make their way through the Alto Limpopo, given that for a long time they have been taught by the recruiters to declare their origin in the regedorias and various administrative departments South of the Save.”(391/B/17/1, Referencia Confidencial a Nota No. 3199/B/17/1 de 30-4-953 do Administrador de Mossurize ao Director da Administracao Civil, May 6,1953.)
15. Machazians believed that reproach by ancestral spirits (the *vadzimu*) could easily be “triggered” by contentious relationships among the living and particularly in defense of the rights of older and senior kin, whose age and social rank ascribed them with a status that was “closer to the ancestors”. The spirits of the dead were also believed to potentially be the source of more grievous forms of harm, usually through the vehicle of witchcraft (*uloi*). Such misfortune was believed to be caused by a *mfukwa*, a particular type or state of spirit motivated to cause death, in conjunction with a specific living actor who either intentionally or unintentionally directed and

facilitated the *mfukwa's* activity. Although *uloi* could be produced through the intentional intervention of ritual specialists, it was also believed that the mere existence of jealousy or intense hostility could open up a path for a *mfukwa* to act. Sometimes a person could unknowingly facilitate *mfukwa* action against another by harboring hostile sentiments against that person. Alternatively, a *mfukwa* could even pursue his (or his kin's) own interests rather than those of an inadvertent facilitator. Machazians consulted *nyangas* and *nyamossolos* two types of "traditional" local healers and diviners, as well as local church *profetas* (prophets) in order to diagnose the sources of social conflict that gave rise to acrimonious socio-spiritual interaction. These specialists were believed capable of identifying which specific spiritual actors caused an illness, of interpreting their intentions and demands vis-à-vis the living, and of interceding with them for resolution. For a more detailed discussion of these beliefs see Lubkemann 2002b.

16. Section 10 permitted the following black people to remain in urban areas: (a) persons who had since birth continuously resided in the prescribed area; (b) persons who had worked continuously in the area for one employer for at least ten years, or had lawfully resided in the area with more than one employer for at least fifteen years; and (c) the wife and children of people qualified under the previous two sections. Under section 10 (d) all other black Africans were classified as either migrants (residents on one year contracts registered through the established labour bureau system) or commuters (those who returned weekly or even daily to their homelands from work in the urban areas). Both of these two statuses had to be established through a registered contract administered by the labour bureau system and did not accumulate credit towards the (a) or (b) criteria for more permanent resident status in the urban areas. Unless specifically exempted under one of the aforementioned provisions all Africans were prohibited from spending more than 72 hours in a 'prescribed white' area (effectively all non-homeland urban areas) (Posel, 1993, 414). Those black labourers not exempted under section 10 could not be legally employed in the urban areas without a specific request by an urban employer for their services. Furthermore it was illegal for an employer to employ them except through the offices of the official rural labour bureau. These bureaux were given the responsibility of ascertaining that no urban black resident who was exempted under section 10 was available for such an urban job before a rural "homeland" resident could be given that employment. Whereas under previous legislation, the enforcement of "influx" control legislation had been largely left up to the discretion of local authorities, the new policies made local governments responsible for mandatory enforcement of this legislation (Posel, 1993). Section 10 status was eventually declared as an eligible status only for those born in the urban areas prior to the date of their homeland's ascribed date of independence (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1985, 8-9).
17. While this did not prevent some young men from staying permanently in South Africa throughout the first half of the century, such cases according to oral accounts tended to be exceptional. The Portuguese curator in South

Africa, commenting on this problem in 1948, alluded to a recent survey in Botswana by Isaac Schapera that estimated that approximately 6% of those Tswana who migrated to South Africa failed to return home because they married South African wives. He believed the percentage among black migrants from the Portuguese territories to be significantly lower (Curadoria de Negocios Indigenas, Relatorio de 1948, Curadoria de Joanesburgo, Uniao de Africa do Sul, 1948, pages 325-327).

18. The development of prosperity in Machaze is reflected perhaps most significantly in new expectations about the ownership of certain material goods. Bicycles first made an appearance in Machaze in the late 1940's, but by 1970 were considered one of the expected prizes to be brought back from a first sojourn in South Africa, often including more than one for oneself but also one particularly for a father. In two separate reports in 1962 the colonial administrator commented on the growing use of a whole range of commercial items including bicycles, chairs, beds, and kerosene lamps, sewing machines, clothing, and suitcases (Relatorio do 1o. Trimestre, "Elevacao da populacao indigena", Administracao da Circ. de Mossurize, April 6, 1962.; Monografia Psicossocial, Posto de Machaze, 1962).
19. The increase in the white settler population was dramatic during the last twenty-five years of colonialism. In the 1950 census a total of 48,213 European settlers were registered; in 1960 this number was 97,245; and in the 1970 census the total number was 158,000. Newitt, 1995, 475; Hall and Young, 1997, 4.
20. Throughout the war Machaze remained far enough away from actual conflict to suffer none of its direct effects, and yet at the same time was close enough to benefit from some basic infrastructural investment driven by colonial forethought about what the war's expansion might bring to the area.
21. It is important to note that Machaze had generally been considered since the beginning of the century to have an insalubrious climate for Europeans. After the administration of the Companhia terminated in 1942, the Portuguese colonial administration established Machaze as a "native reserve" area where white settlement was not to be pursued (Servico de Agrimensura de Manica e Sofala, Relatorio Annual de 1953)—a status that applied until 1962.
22. a pseudonym. In accordance with standard anthropological practice in warzones and similarly dangerous places all names used in this article are pseudonyms in order to protect interview subjects.
23. In my own fieldwork in the townships in 1997, I found that those few Machaze women who actually had joined their husbands in South Africa had proven to be quite successful entrepreneurs. In 1997 I conducted a small survey-based review of the economic situation of 31 households in the townships in which wives from Machaze were present. On average these women earned at least 44% of the total reported monthly household budget and all but 3 (under 10%) generated income for the household. In contrast 30% of these same households contained one or more adult who were unemployed and contributed nothing to the household expenses. It is important to point out that this survey highlights the situation in 1997 and

not necessarily throughout the 1980's when the war was in full swing. However women from throughout southern Africa have been extensively studied and documented as successfully involved in the informal economy in the townships for well over two decades.

24. Some exceptional women managed to make their way to South Africa of despite lacking or misleading information and resistance from husbands, by availing themselves of the services of *hoomuchas*—a “profession” that experienced spectacular growth during the war. *Hoomuchas* were paid professionals who specialized in smuggling people, messages and sometimes things back and forth across international borders for a fee. Sometimes they would be paid by a Machazian in South Africa to bring back a specific family member to South Africa—almost always a male relative. However, at times these *hoomuchas* would drum up business in the UNHCR camps, or among self-settled Machazians in Zimbabwe or Mozambique, by claiming to know where a person's family members were in South Africa (sometimes truthfully and sometimes not) and offering for a fee to take the person back to that family member even if the relative in South Africa had not solicited this service. However in several cases men reportedly actually sent these wives back to the camps in Zimbabwe or even into the war-zone in Mozambique itself!
25. In late 1997 I worked closely with my team of Machazian research associates in South Africa to survey two-hundred Machazian men residing in the peri-urban townships of the Vaal area.
26. While the post-conflict expansion of transnational polygyny offered many benefits to migrant men after the war it also reconfigured the balance of gendered power within marriages in ways that profoundly affected other social actors—most notably spouses. In particular the development of more permanent relationships between Machazian men and South African women has eroded many of the benefits women in Machaze once experienced from polygyny, while accentuating many of the problems such arrangements had often implied. Before the war, a husband's marriage to a co-wife represented an ambiguous combination of potential gains and losses for a Machazian wife. Whereas co-wives were often regarded as rivals and a likely source of *uloi*, they also could help ease a senior wife's heavy domestic labour requirements.. A junior wife often provided labour to a mother-in-law that released a senior wife from these responsibilities, thus affording her greater independence and enhancing her status. Consequently, it had not been uncommon for a wife to consent to the idea—or even actually suggest—that her husband take a co-wife, and to actually play a role in her selection. However, all the potential benefits of having a co-wife were only possible if she lived in relatively close proximity. Co-wives who lived in another country altogether afforded no relief from domestic labour and did not enhance the autonomy of Machazian women. Unable to monitor the distribution of a husband's resources in the same way they could with co-resident co-wives, Machazian women in transnationally polygynous marriages also

often complained that South African wives siphoned the bulk of their husband's earning, thus reducing the remittances they received back Mozambique. The post-conflict entrenchment and growth of transnational polygyny has therefore not only transformed the meaning of migration but has generated new and more intense forms of gendered social struggle within Machazian society that promise to play their own part in reconfiguring the migration regime itself. I have explored Machazian women's perspectives extensively elsewhere (in particular in Lubkemann 2000c and, 2008).

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