

# 19 Situating Migration in Wartime and Post-war Mozambique: A Critique of 'Forced Migration' Research

STEPHEN C. LUBKEMANN

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyses the causes, organization, and impact of wartime migration during and since Mozambique's recent civil war (1977–92), in order to challenge theories that establish categorizations of migration based on the degree of its 'forcedness'. It demonstrates how these predominant demographic theories of forced migration rest on a highly reductionist model of migratory decision-making in acute crisis contexts that fails to adequately examine actor agency and the social and cultural factors that inform agency in producing demographic outcomes.

Drawing on a case study of Mozambicans from the district of Machaze, this chapter demonstrates how wartime and post-conflict migratory patterns were influenced by more than the macro-political and military dynamics of the war itself. Well before the war migration was already 'situated' as a strategic option used in an array of local-level social struggles over the rights and obligations that defined social relationships within households, extended kinship networks, and the local community. These culturally specified social struggles in which migration was already implicated prior to the war, significantly shaped wartime migration in ways that ultimately resulted in a highly gendered demographic distribution. This study focuses in particular on how struggles over the gendered configuration of power relations within marriage, affected wartime and post-war Machazian migration. More broadly, it challenges theoretical models of so-called forced migration that privilege the analysis of macro-political struggle in explaining the causes and organization of wartime movement and proposes steps towards developing alternative theoretical approaches to the study of crisis migration.

## KINETIC MODELS: THE ERASURE OF AGENCY IN EXPLANATION

Most explicit models and implicit approaches used to analyse so-called forced migration have a 'kinetic' understanding of migratory behaviour that is undertaken under conditions of extreme duress. In 'kinetically structured' models the behaviour of

populations subjected to crisis conditions, is explained in terms of forces that are analytically conceptualized as external to and largely beyond the influence of the actors themselves.

The term 'kinetics' was formally articulated in the rather abstract models produced by Kunz (1973, 1981) in his creation of a formal typology of refugee flows. Kunz contrasts 'kinetic' with 'dynamic' models of behaviour. In a 'kinetic' model, forces external to the migrants themselves are seen as determining the actors' migration behaviour largely apart from their own internal motivations. By contrast in 'dynamic' models the internal motivation of the migrant is seen as playing a far more significant role in shaping migration behaviour and outcomes. Kunz explained his understanding of forced migration behaviour as 'kinetic' by using the following analogy: 'an inner self-propelling force is singularly absent from the movement of refugees. Their progress more often than not resembles the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction their path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction, and the vectors of outside forces applied on them' (Kunz 1973: 131).

Kinetic models eliminate the need to investigate actor agency altogether, by reducing the interest of all 'forced migrants' to a singular and universally generalizable 'survival-utility'. In other words, in the throes of war, people are seen as having no life projects other than bare survival itself. This formulation is implicitly premised on the assumption that in the face of sheer terror, violence somehow renders all 'normal' concerns for engagement in ongoing, culturally defined, social life-strategies virtually insignificant in shaping behaviour. The presumption is that the singularly overriding concern of those threatened by violence is to avoid it. Since the motivational basis for migration has been operationalized a priori in a socially undifferentiated form (as the desire to avoid violence), there is no need to examine how it is that people make sense of the violent context in which they find themselves. Nor is it necessary to investigate whether such culturally shaped or socially specific understandings affect their migratory conduct in those situations.

Instead, the explanations for patterns and effects of forced migration are sought through the analysis of the dynamics and variation in forces conceptualized as external to, and unaffected by, the agency of migrants. Political forces receive privileged attention in these analyses since they are the most visible macrolevel forces implicated in coercive violence. 'Violence' itself is conceptualized as a phenomenon that is directed solely by the interests and agendas of the highest organizational level at which political struggle is being carried out—typically those political actors with national political pretensions. 'Violence' is thus also implicitly conceived of as a phenomenon whose meaning is generated by forces external to its victims, and that therefore acts on them in uniform ways and with uniform effects.

Variation among migrants themselves, in terms of their own motivations and the factors that inform those motivations, is largely neglected. To build on Kunz's own billiards analogy the emphasis in kinetic analysis is centred on the 'cue' rather than the 'ball', that is, on analysing ball movements by examining what types of 'cues' (larger political forces) are 'forcing' the 'balls' (migrants) to behave in particular ways, and not on how the properties of different balls might effect varying reactions to the cue's force.

In its simplest form, these approaches model wartime migration in the following manner: war or the threat of war occurs in area 'A' and acts as a force akin to a billiard cue that drives actors from area 'A' of violence to the nearest area 'B' without violence. This process may be replicated in a series of stages producing a variety of refugee 'vintages' (Kunz 1973, 1981), each the product of different military-political actions (Wilson and Nunes 1992). Differences between successive vintages are attributed to their political affiliation, on the assumption that political affiliation will affect the relationship of a populace to a military force and thus their exposure to the risk of violence as the military fortunes of war change. Wilson and Nunes (1992) describe how refugees who were politically aligned with FRELIMO (the government) fled across the Malawian border in the face of a RENAMO (the insurgency) offensive. This initial wave was later followed by refugees from the same area who were politically aligned with RENAMO, when FRELIMO succeeded in recapturing the area it had lost.<sup>1</sup>

These behavioural models assume that the extreme threat faced by these populations has entirely stripped away their concern with 'normal social concerns', leading then to focus exclusively on what are implicitly viewed as more 'fundamental' and culturally undifferentiated 'needs'. In conceiving of 'culture' as simply another set of variables distinct from economic and political ones, yet hierarchically subordinate and without the same level of influence on behaviour, these approaches are similar in many ways to the concepts of culture often deployed by demographers in the study of a variety of demographic processes, including (but not limited to) migration (Kertzer 1997).

## AGENCY AND THE 'FORCED' MIGRATION PARADOX IN SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS

Anthropologists have increasingly critiqued certain aspects of kinetic models of forced migration. The depiction of wartime displacement as 'involuntary' has drawn some criticism for depicting refugee behaviour as a merely passive by-product of larger political processes and for neglecting to examine how refugees shape their own outcomes as agents who draw from their own culturally specific values and frameworks, and who are motivated by socially differentiated interests in creating and implementing their life strategies (Colson 1971; Harrell-Bond 1986; Hansen 1992; Wilson 1994; Malkki 1995; Indra 1999; Lubkemann 2000; Sommers 2001; Matsouka and Sorenson 2001).

Gender differentiation has been the most important focus of this critique (Koenig 1995; Colson 1999; Indra 1999). Several studies have demonstrated how gender-power relations affect the distribution and effects of humanitarian aid (Harrell-Bond 1986; Daley 1991; Matlou 1999) and the assignment of political status (Gilad 1999; Giles 1999; Macklin 1999). Other important studies have shown how the impact and meaning of forced relocation can be highly gender-differentiated (Moussa 1993; Moussa and McSpadden 1996; Indra 1999; Matsouka and Sorenson 2001), and can result in the significant renegotiation of gender roles (Daley 1991;

Krufeld 1994; McSpadden 1999). Significantly, however, these works tend to *start with the movement itself as a fait accompli*. While numerous studies examine how the experience of movement affects gender relations and identities, there is a noticeable paucity of research on how struggles over the constitution of gendered roles and relationships may influence the organization of movement itself.

Consequently refugee, or more generally wartime migration, is still typically categorized as ‘involuntary’ (or more recently as ‘forced’) in order for it to be able to be explicitly theorized (Stein 1981; Oliver-Smith and Hansen 1982; Scudder and Colson 1982; Rogge 1987; Richmond 1988, 1994; Zolberg *et al.* 1989; Black and Robinson 1993; Indra 1999) as an analytically separate phenomenon from ‘voluntary’ (labour) migration. In fact this dichotomy defines an increasingly institutionalized sub-field of study itself—it is *forced* migration (and thus presumably *not* ‘un-forced’ migration) that is the object of study. Indra clearly reiterates the idea that migration in crisis can be distinguished from other forms of migration by the restricted volition migrants exercise, when she states: ‘a key dimension of forced migration—whether politically, economically, environmentally, or developmentally driven—is just that: it is *forced*’ (Indra 1999: 18).

There is clearly an implicit (and somewhat ironic) logical contradiction in arguing for the investigation of agency in a process and population while defining that process and population a priori precisely by its lack of agency. This contradiction arises out of the failure of social analysts to fully apply their critique of the premises that inform kinetic models to *all* aspects of crisis migration processes—including movement itself. Agency is not only a factor in how the displaced react to relocation but also in the *causation* and *organization* of actual movement itself.

As Richmond (1988, 1994) has pointed out, kinetic models of ‘forced migration’ cannot explain the fact that a variety of different (migratory) behaviours occur among people who are exposed to the same macro-political conditions. They cannot adequately explain social and demographic variation in specific direction, scale and socio-demographic composition of particular flows, or the existence of a variety of simultaneous flows.

Moreover, in the absence of political differences, kinetic models have difficulty accounting for why some people move and others do not. After all if the migration is ‘compelled’ by larger external forces how can some people *not* move? As Richmond notes (1988: 14) migration is *not* the only choice that so called ‘forced migrants’ face when confronted by forms of economic, environmental, or political crisis. Other options may include those of staying and actively fighting, of passively resisting, or of accommodating to new regimes (Hansen 1982). Richmond is therefore correct in arguing that: ‘migratory decisions, even those taken under conditions of extreme stress, do not differ from other kinds of decision governing social behaviour. The same sociological model of motivation is applicable ... the distinction between “free” and forced, or “voluntary” and “involuntary” is a misleading one’ (Richmond 1988: 17).

Yet despite noting that a typology of behaviour based on a dichotomy between freedom and lack-of-freedom in the exercise of volition (‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’) is fallacious, Richmond's own alternative formulation simply converts the differentiation

from a *dichotomy* into a *continuum*. He argues for conceptualizing all migration along a continuum: 'at one end of which individuals and collectives are *proactive* and at the other end *reactive*' (1988: 17).

Drawing on Giddens' theorization of 'agency' Richmond derives the conclusion that 'choices are not unlimited but are determined by the structuration process' (1988: 17), from the fact that 'all human behaviour is constrained'.<sup>2</sup> Yet I would contend that it is more specifically the *consequences* of choices that we are referring to, rather than the process of choosing or even the range of choices per se that are being constrained. It is the *consequences* rather than the *array of choices* themselves that are determined by factors largely outside of the power of the agent making the choices to influence, and despite their explicit intentions.

Thus as Colson (1971, 1999) has described in her study of the 'forced resettlement' of the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia, the action of larger and more powerful forces such as the central state confronted locals with an array of choices with consequences not of their own choosing. They could comply with government directives to relocate and face social and economic disruption as a result. Conversely they could resist relocation and face drastic forms of repression from the state with its far greater coercive capacity.

It is such dramatic differences in power and the drastic nature of the consequences that can result from the exercise of that power that make choices that avoid such consequences seem 'involuntary'. Thus, as Fischer *et al.* note: 'we perceive what one may call "involuntary" migration as extreme situations where the decision to go is "self-evident"' (1997: 50). However, the theoretical point is precisely that such decisions are *not* so 'self-evident' but must rather be problematized in light of the multidimensional concerns of socially and culturally situated actors.

Colson's study is often considered as one of the 'purest' examples of the 'forcedness' of 'forced migration'. Yet in reviewing this study over a quarter century later Colson points out that there were those among the Gwembe Tonga who resisted resettlement and died as a consequence of the Zambian state's reaction (Colson 1999). She thus empirically establishes that even in the most extreme cases the relationship between a choice and the degree of drastic consequences related to that choice, does not predetermine the decisions made nor establish the choice of one option or another as a self-evident or foregone conclusion.

So-called forced or involuntary migration is thus not the result of a constrained capacity to exercise one's own volition, such that behaviour is the inevitable result of the decision-maker pursuing a choice that is a foregone conclusion dictated by environmental factors. Rather it is the result of a weighing of multiple options and the exercise of the decision-maker's *full* volition, albeit in circumstances in which the *consequences* of choice have often become drastically radicalized and reduced to outcomes that the chooser/s would rather not have to face.

The most fundamental consequence of classifying migration behaviour in terms of 'degrees of freedom of volition' is that it precludes a priori an investigation of whether people in those migratory processes pre-classified as 'forced' actually do shape their own movement with reference to a broader array of concerns than those visible at the

macro-political level. It presents a drastically oversimplified and reductionist picture of the context in which crisis migration occurs, depicting the displaced as entirely powerless in the face of military and political might. Yet as Foucault (1972) has argued, power is pervasive and multidimensional in its forms. Even where extreme forms of power difference exist forms of resistance are likely to emerge. This subversive power is a critical element in the constitution of social process.

By contrast, the highlighting of agency in *all* aspects of the migration process (including the causes and organization of movement itself) demands an investigation of how culturally specific social interests shape the motivations that inform migratory decision-making. This is also the only analytical route that can place migratory choice and behaviour in crisis into a proper comparative context that encompasses decisions to engage crisis through strategies other than migration. Within such an approach alternative options such as 'staying' can also be fully examined.

The following analysis demonstrates how gendered struggle over the definition of rights and obligations within households, and most specifically between spouses within marriage, influenced migratory dynamics and demographic distribution outcomes during (and after) the war in central Mozambique. More than simply investigating the gender-differentiated impact of the war and of wartime migration, this study investigates how the process of what I term 'engenderation' (i.e. the ongoing struggle over how relationships and power between and among men and women in Machaze should be defined) influenced the organization of wartime migration and population distribution as well as post-wartime patterns of 'return migration'. The objectives of different categories of social actors engaged in the process of 'engenderation' were ones largely generated prior to, and apart from, those of the larger political conflict.

This case thus demonstrates how wartime migration decision-making, organization, and socio-demographic outcomes can be shaped by social struggles other than those operating at a macro-political level and that larger political-economic forces are not *determinative* of migratory behaviour. Rather, the influence of larger political-economic forces on migration can be better understood by examining how larger changes affected the redistribution of power in the culturally specific social struggles in which migration was already implicated as a strategy of engagement.

## THE MACHAZIAN CASE STUDY

This case is based on approximately 2 years of research among Mozambicans, loosely definable as ethnically Ndau (a subgroup of Shona speakers), all originally from an area in the south central part of that country (the Machaze district).<sup>3</sup> This is a region in which labour migration to South Africa and present-day Zimbabwe has been engaged in since at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Under the Portuguese colonial regime, migration developed as both a strategy for social reproduction and as a form of resistance against the colonial state's pursuit of particular interests at odds with those of the population (such as forced labour)

(Lubkemann 2000*a*). The structure of migration and the relationship between local and national-level institutions were influenced by the very contradictions of a colonial rule not unlike that in other settings (Berry 1993; Young 1994). The colony's internal need for labour (which frowned upon migrant labour to South Africa) was pitted against its needs for tax revenue (which migrant labour provided) and for maintaining political order with a skeleton bureaucratic apparatus. These circumstances required forms of indirect rule and moderation in state attempts to contest local norms. In this context migration developed as a particularly powerful 'weapon of the weak' (Scott 1985) in resisting forced labour practices, and consequently as a particularly central force in the organization of local social institutions and identities (Lubkemann 2000*a*).

At the same time that migration allowed Machazians to resist the power of the coercive power of colonial state, it also became implicated in strategies of local socio-economic differentiation, intergenerational struggle, and in the struggle over gendered power distribution within households. Throughout the first half of the century migration became an increasingly important way for younger men to attain greater independence for senior kin through wage earnings that afforded them the ability to pay brideprice without relying on their fathers. This line of intergenerational struggle resulted in the increased nuclearization of what had at one time been far larger extended households (Lubkemann 2000*a*).

Even as it enabled the subversion of generational hierarchies, from the perspective of gendered 'micro-politics' migration increasingly became a 'tool for the strong' in Machaze's patriarchal society. The reorganization of co-residence, the shift in power relations between senior and junior kinsmen, the higher rate of migrant earnings, and the heightened consumerism of migrant men from Machaze had a profound effect on the meaning of marriage in Machaze, and consequently on the status and power of Machazian women. In particular throughout the last three decades of colonial rule marriage became an increasingly 'commodified' relationship in which women were treated as the commodities. The power of decision-making regarding marriage partner's choice increasingly became a choice negotiated by husbands in their own individual interest rather than by senior men in the interest of kinship alliance.

Migration was centrally implicated in strategies of local socio-economic differentiation, inter-generational struggle, and in the struggle over gendered power distribution and the definition of rights and obligations within marriage. Migration has thus been continuously 're-situated' as a strategy in multiple simultaneous forms of social struggle well before the civil war started in 1977.

Within 3 years of its independence in 1975, Mozambique began to experience a civil war, largely spurred on by the aggression of the hostile neighbouring Rhodesian and South African apartheid regimes. By late 1979 Machaze was fully embroiled in the war between the Rhodesian (and later South African) supported anti-government faction RENAMO and the government forces of FRELIMO. During the conflict (that lasted until the end of 1992) somewhere between 40 and 70 per cent of the population is estimated to have left the district, many to South Africa and Zimbabwe, and some to internal destinations elsewhere within Mozambique (GTZ 1993, 1995, 1996; CARE 1994).

## Explaining engendered patterns of initial out-migration from Machaze

As the armed conflict developed and intensified in Machaze district during 1979–82, some form of migratory response was engaged in by virtually the entire population of the district. These movements were patterned in highly gender-specific ways. Machazian women were far more likely than men to either remain in the district, to move to adjacent areas within Mozambique, or to move to Zimbabwe to resettle in refugee camps.<sup>4</sup> Men, on the other hand, particularly if they had migratory experience in South Africa and had not yet retired from their careers as labour migrants, were likely to flee to South Africa. A very small percentage of women ever went to South Africa.

One of the factors conducive to the gender selectivity of out-of-district migration involved the very different ways in which women and men were targeted by the military forces involved in the conflict. When women and children were found by either RENAMO or FRELIMO troops in their opponents' territory they were generally compelled at gunpoint to relocate into the area under the control of the troops that found them. Men on the other hand tended to either be forcibly conscripted into military service or be killed on the spot. Consequently men had more motivation than women to flee out of the district and, if possible, across international borders.

However, gendered differences in initial out-migration patterns also reflected an attempt by both men and women to engage in long-established strategies of economic and social reproduction. International migration has been implicated in the organization of social life in Machaze for demonstrably over a century. The pre-war experience of subsistence involved a social division of labour between female non-migratory agricultural subsistence labour and male migratory cash-earning labour. Male migration was virtually universal and incorporated as an informal and yet strongly socially marked rite of male passage. Male participation in economic life was embodied first and foremost in the form of migration-based wage-labour, and only secondarily and peripherally in very specific and sporadic tasks in the subsistence agriculture arena (mostly clearing new fields). The vast majority of men spent most of their migratory careers in South Africa. Moreover, international migration had long been the preferred strategy for dealing with the periodic intensifications in colonial labour recruitment and taxation (which the Portuguese had only levied against men in this area). The flight of men to South Africa during the beginning of the war thus reproduced historically established models for dealing with coercive political authority.

By contrast, female non-migration in Machaze has been historically virtually universal (unlike the experience in other areas of Mozambique) and their economic activity was relatively rigidly circumscribed to non-cash subsistence agriculture. It is thus unsurprising that women who were forced to relocate early in the war moved within the district where they could still pursue subsistence agriculture—an option that would be difficult to realize if they engaged in international migration.

Early Machazian migratory and non-migratory reactions to the war can thus be seen as primarily attempts to reproduce ongoing strategies of social and economic

reproduction in a novel environment rather than as attempts to reconfigure those life strategies themselves. The initial gendered pattern of the Machazian population's wartime demographic distribution reflected an attempt to adjust pre-war socio-economic strategies to the heightened dangers and new problems of a wartime environment. It also reflected attempts by different categories of social actors to reconstitute central features of the socio-economic realities with which they were most familiar.

## Engendered social struggle: men protecting established life strategies

Ultimately however, migratory patterns and population distribution outcomes were not only the result of socially situated attempts to reproduce a culturally defined socio-economic 'order'. They were also shaped by continuing struggles over the meaning of relationships and the configuration of social interaction. These struggles had already characterized Machazian social process prior to the war and as this case study will demonstrate they were neither suspended nor eclipsed by it.<sup>5</sup>

By 1984 when the war was aggressively spreading into other areas of the country for the first time (such as Cabo Delgado and parts of Zambezia and Niassa provinces) it had already raged in Machaze for half a decade. As the war dragged on year after year it became less and less possible for Machazians to treat the new problems and opportunities that the conflict presented as temporary factors in the calculation, imagination, and implementation of their life-strategies.

The interrelated problems of wartime violence, successive displacement, and chronic drought within Mozambique during the 1980s increasingly rendered subsistence strategies less tenable for those remaining in Mozambique. Early in the war many men attempted to continue to provide assistance in the form of remittances to family members who remained in Mozambique. With the intensification of the war, the polarization of population concentrations, and the collapse of regular access to the district, remittances became more and more problematic. Money sent with migrants who attempted to make their way back into the district was lost as many of those individuals were killed and/or robbed.

Consequently, many Machazian men abroad either sent instructions or else personally returned to help family members move into safer areas within Mozambique or across the border to the refugee camps established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While they generally then returned alone to South Africa, many of these men sent financial support and maintained communication channels with their families in these 'surrogate home bases'. However the overwhelming majority of these men *systematically resisted* having family members, and spouses in particular, join them in South Africa. In fact husbands quite actively discouraged their spouses from coming to join them in South Africa even if they expressed a desire to do so.

Keeping dependants, and in particular wives, in the UNHCR camps allowed men to continue to pursue long established life-course strategies in important ways that would have been far more difficult if their wives had joined them in South Africa. One important benefit was that the humanitarian aid provided in these camps

reduced the cost for maintaining their families much as subsistence production had done back in Machaze. Subsistence cultivation in the township areas in which most Machazian migrants lived in South Africa was impossible. The townships in the Vaal region in which many Machazian men had resettled consisted of small houses and shacks, with tiny yards generally less than 10 m<sup>2</sup> in area, sprawled from horizon to horizon. Even small garden plots and animals such as chickens were rarely seen since these were likely to be stolen. Consequently many men whom I interviewed argued that having a Machazian wife move to South Africa would drain their earnings because she would become a dependant herself:

M: 'What could she (my Machazian wife) do here except "eat my money?" There is nowhere to plant a *maachamba*. She could not sell fruit because she does not know the language or the Rand (the South African currency) and these South African women are very clever and would deceive her so she would lose everything. Even to cook here you must have money. You must buy charcoal. It is not like Machaze where she can go and find firewood snap snap ... she would not want to eat *sadzza* only anymore because the South African women also want to eat (corn)flakes and cakes and this would eat my money because she would stay at home all day sitting.'

The claim that Machazian women would have inevitably become an economic burden on their husbands in South Africa is somewhat questionable. Migrant women to South African township areas have been shown by a considerable body of research to be quite successful participants in the flourishing informal economy in these areas (Bozzoli 1991*a,b*; Preston-Whyte 1991). In my own fieldwork in these townships those few Machaze women who actually had joined their husbands in South Africa proved to be quite successful entrepreneurs. In two cases Machazian wives provided the sole income for their entire households and supported their unemployed Mozambican husbands. In 1997, I conducted a small survey-based review of the economic situation of thirty-one households in the townships in which wives from Machaze were present. On average these women earned at least 44 per cent of the total reported monthly household budget. All of these households included more members than just the husband and wife. Furthermore 30 per cent of these households contained one or more adult men who were being supported at the time as dependants since they were unemployed and contributed nothing to the household expenses (Lubkemann 2000*a*: 417–19).<sup>6</sup> The effect that a wife's services had on other dependent family members that remained with them in refugee camps (such as small children and aged parents) probably provided husbands with a more important economic motive for preventing wives from leaving those camps and joining their husbands in South Africa. Such dependants would most probably have been economically unproductive in South Africa and represented a substantial drain on income.

As my fieldwork in South Africa progressed 'non-economic' reasons increasingly surfaced as playing an important role in Machazian men's efforts to prevent their spouses from joining them in South Africa. Machazian men in South Africa frequently express longing for aspects of their life in Machaze which they miss in South

Africa—the fact that in Machaze they do not need to pay for cooking or heating fuel, that most food is produced rather than paid for, that one can live with little money. The ability of men to pursue these life strategies was (and even today remains) dependent on two factors: control over the labour of wives who provide all these services free of cash, and on women's willingness to accept the culturally sanctioned gendered division of labour, power, and authority which define social roles within marriage and the family.

Women historically have and still do provide virtually all of the labour for the practice of subsistence agriculture in Machaze. In Machaze poor land quality and acute water scarcity make domestic and agricultural tasks highly labour intensive. Women perform most of these labour-intensive tasks. For example, the average woman walks over 8 km per day to get water. Although men may participate in all parts of the agricultural cycle, they are often only expected to participate in the initial clearing of fields—a labour intensive but fairly short exercise that may occur every 2–5 years. The rest of the agricultural activities are culturally prescribed as primarily 'women's work'.

Throughout the twentieth century Machazian men's life strategies have depended on rather acute culturally prescribed asymmetries in gender relations that allow them to exploit women's labour for their own benefit. Keeping women in Machaze and preventing their out-migration has served as a major mechanism for preserving this asymmetry. The virtually complete restriction on female migration has thus served other purposes besides those of colonial governance and capitalist accumulation. The asymmetry of power that men achieved through their gendered monopoly on (migration-based) sources of cash has played an important role in their ability to control women's labour and foster relationships of female dependence on men. The recognition by Machazian men of the importance of controlling female migration in order to reproduce this social order played a significant role in shaping wartime migration in and from Machaze, and ultimately in the demographic distribution of Machazian refugee populations.

Most men I interviewed expressed a strong desire to keep Machazian women unaware of ways of life in peri-urban South Africa (in which very different gender roles prevailed) that would put in question women's willingness to engage in the labour or level of deference upon which men's ease of life back in Machaze depended. Although not always the case, most Machazian men felt that a sojourn in Zimbabwe would not have the same negative effect on Machazian women that time spent in South Africa would since movement outside the camps was restricted by the authorities, and the cultural setting in rural Zimbabwe was less drastically different than that the peri-urban townships of South Africa.

Wives also contributed substantial labour to their husband's parents—in particular to their mothers-in-law. This labour was crucial in sustaining a man's relationship with his mother. As documented more extensively elsewhere (Lubkemann 2000a, 2002) the mother–son relationship had increasingly gained importance for migratory sons during the post-Second World War period as homesteads tended towards greater nuclearization. Mothers had become the overseers of their son's social and

economic affairs in Machaze during their migratory sojourns abroad, safeguarding his interests in his absence. The importance of this mother–son relationship was strongly sustained by beliefs about the ways in which ancestral spirits were implicated in its safeguarding. At least three men I interviewed admitted returning to Mozambique to procure a wife and leave her with their mother with no other purpose than the aversion of problems with ancestral spirits. One man described his own situation as follows:

G: ‘When I first heard that my mother was complaining I was worried. I went to the *profeta* (prophet) who gave me this “charm” so that the *mudzimu* (family spirits) would not trouble me after I sent her money. After a year I was getting very very ill and the *profeta* said that no, I must go back to visit. When I returned I saw that my mother could not get water ... I paid the *lobola* (brideprice) for a woman so my mother could “lean on her” and then (after three months) I came back to South Africa ... my life is mostly here now...’

## Engendered social struggle: men pursuing new opportunities

Whereas preventing Machazian women from joining them in South Africa played a role in protecting already long established life-strategies for many Machazian men, it also allowed these men to take advantage of new social opportunities in South Africa itself. Prior to the civil war a whole series of significant regulatory, labour-market, social and demographic changes in South Africa had established new social and economic possibilities for migrant Machazian men. The most important of these changes involved the shift from legal and regulated mine labour participation to illegal participation in the secondary or tertiary labour sector starting in the decade following the Second World War. Whereas 76 per cent of migrants surveyed were involved in mine labour in the migrant labour trips undertaken prior to 1950, by 1977, 62 per cent of migrant labourers were now involved in the secondary/tertiary sector and only 44 per cent in mine labour (Lubkemann 2000a: 118–19). Mine labour involved deferred payment and obligatory return home after 18 months for 6-month (minimum) leaves. However, other forms of employment did not have these time restrictions, nor did they involve deferred pay schemes. Unlike the highly state-regulated mine-labour wages, full salaries were thus received in South Africa. Finally wages in service and industrial jobs rapidly outdistanced mine wages so that by the early 1970s they stood at more than double on average (Crush and Yudelman 1991; Lubkemann 2000c).

As more and more Machazians had pursued these better-paying jobs throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many obtained either forged South African identification documents or bribed officials for legal ones. Such individuals could then ‘pass’ as ‘legal’ South African citizens.

The widespread emergence of township and township-based (hostel) housing as a replacement for compounds for migrant men during the 1960s and 1970s also created new social opportunities in South Africa for Machazian men. Starting in the mid-1960s the peri-urban township areas in the industrial heartland of South Africa experienced a massive explosion of illegal squatter settlement that overwhelmed any

official attempts to thwart or check it (Schlemmer and Moller 1985). Meanwhile the growth of (South African) female migration to these peri-urban areas vastly improved the 'conjugal market' for men in these urban areas (Smit 1985: 116–17). These changes opened up new social possibilities and widened the array of possible social relations to increasingly include more involved forms of conjugal union. The move to the hostels in the 1960s thus opened up new sexual, domestic, and economic relationship possibilities for Mozambican men with South African women.

The economic downturn and resulting employment crisis in South Africa during the late 1970s gave employers considerably more power over employees that they did not hesitate to exercise to their advantage (Crush *et al.* 1991: 127–30). Up to the time of Mozambican independence Machazian men reported that they often overstayed official leave times, or even left employment in one company in order to seek employment elsewhere without having a definite alternative already established. As unemployment rose Machazian men began to comply with these stricter requirement in order to maintain their jobs. The average leave time of 2 weeks granted by employers and its stricter enforcement strongly discouraged these men from being able to easily or as frequently visit their families and homes back in Machaze while further encouraging the establishment of stronger residential ties in South Africa (Lubkemann 2000c).

All of these pre-conflict changes created conditions that encouraged Machazian men to establish denser social and economic ties and commitments in South Africa. As the war in Mozambique intensified and eventually started to drag out for years on end, South African options became more and more attractive to many Machazian men who had initially expected the war to blow over quickly and allow them to return to their regular patterns of circular labour migration. More and more Machazian men began to consider the possibility that they might never be able to reconstitute their lives back in Mozambique:

L: 'At first I did not think about the war so much. I did not visit Machaze because it was too "hot" there. Some went back but never returned so I was afraid to go because I could be killed. Later I heard that my father had been killed but I did not hear about my mother or my wife so I thought they were dead too. I started to think that the situation in Mozambique would be too hot because FRELIMO and RENAMO never wanted to stop fighting even after President Samora was killed. So I said this war will not stop—I must stay in this place.'

For some the war had partially or thoroughly disrupted their contact with some or even all their family members back in Mozambique. Consequently the possibility of developing alternative ways of realizing their own life-course strategies through involved conjugal relationships with South African women proved an increasingly attractive option.

Whereas among those Machazians surveyed who had been employed in non-mine migration from 1970 to 1978, 30 per cent reported being engaged during that time in a conjugal relationship with South African women. In an additional survey of over 200 Machazian men living in the townships in 1997 over 79 per cent reported being in (or having been in) such a relationship during the previous decade (Lubkemann 2000c).

However, Machazian men were aware that South African women were not generally receptive to the idea of polygyny in general and adamantly opposed in particular to the presence of a Mozambican wife in their homes in South Africa. These men also feared that Machazian women would become discontent at the discovery of South African counterparts resenting their lack of authority over these supposedly 'junior' wives. Husband feared that they would be more likely to be exposed to *uloi* (witchcraft) as a result. The physical proximity of the Machazian woman was believed to amplify the effect of that *uloi*:

J: 'If she (a Machazian wife) comes here (to South Africa) then there can be big problems with *uloi* because the (South African) woman does not want her to be in her house. Everyone will suffer then.'

Interviewer: 'Do you mean that the South African woman will cause *uloi* that will harm the Machazian woman?'

J: 'No, that is not the case. The South African woman cannot cause the *uloi*. But she will suffer because the Machazian woman will cause *uloi*. Then the husband can suffer too. This is what happened with M.'

N: 'The two children died and then his (South African) wife went to the police and reported him because she did not want more of her children to die. So he had to take his (Machazian) wife (to another township).'

The presence of a Machazian wife in South Africa could also threaten to expose the Mozambican identity of these illegally settled men, subjecting them to greater risks of deportation. Many of these men had concealed their Mozambican identity even from their South African spouses, presenting themselves as Shangaanas from the Giyani area in South Africa.

Machazian men consequently went to considerable lengths to minimize the possibilities for Machazian wives to join them in South Africa. Some men refused to respond to letters from spouses who requested assistance that would allow them to join their husbands in South Africa, sometimes under the pretext that they had never received these letters in the first place. Others provided dubious and misleading reasons why spouses should not come to South Africa, or else promised what eventually became indefinitely delayed decisions—a more passive and yet nevertheless effective form of preventing women from coming to South Africa: 'A: "Initially I wrote back (to his wife in the UNHCR camp) that it was not possible for her to come here because I was living in a hostel and women were not allowed. After I bought this house I continued to say I was living in the hostel so she would not come."'

Some exceptional women managed to make their way to South Africa despite the lacking or misleading information and resistance from husbands, by availing themselves of the services of *boomuchas*—a 'profession' that experienced spectacular growth during the war. *Boomuchas* were paid professionals who specialized in smuggling people, messages, and sometimes things back and forth across international borders for a fee. Sometimes they would be paid by a Machazian in South Africa to bring back a specific family member to South Africa—almost always a male relative. However, at times these *boomuchas* would drum up business in the UNHCR camps, or among self-settled Machazians in Zimbabwe or Mozambique, by claiming to know

where a person's family members were in South Africa (sometimes truthfully and sometimes not) and offering for a fee to take the person back to that family member even if the relative in South Africa had not solicited this service. These cases are very few but they are illustrative because of the response that they sometimes produced. In some cases wives were actually sent back by their husbands to the camps in Zimbabwe and in two interview cases actually back into the war-zone in Mozambique itself!

Thus the gendered demographic distribution among residents from Machaze largely resulted from the way in which men manipulated information and guarded historically gendered 'experience capital' (related to migration) in order to further their own agendas. 'Gender politics' thus clearly played a significant role, entirely apart from the macro-political agenda of the war, in shaping the organization of Machazian wartime migration.

## PROBLEMATIZING MACHAZIAN 'RETURN' MIGRATION

### The humanitarian community's understanding of 'return' migration

In 1993–5 the UNHCR in conjunction with various humanitarian relief and assistance organizations carried out in Mozambique what has been widely regarded as one of its most successful repatriation efforts ever. Over 1.6 million Mozambican refugees were estimated to have returned either spontaneously or through the organized efforts of the humanitarian community, from Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa. UNHCR estimated that it had assisted in the organized return of approximately 320,000 people (UNHCR 1995*a*).

The repatriation effort was generally assessed as a successful realization of the humanitarian community's estimation, planning, and implementation efforts in all of these countries ... with the notable exception of the repatriation from South Africa. The repatriation of Mozambicans from South Africa was considered to be a rather frustrating case in which results fell far short of expectations. UNHCR originally estimated that over 200,000 (of an estimated total of 250,000) self-settled Mozambicans in South Africa would return during 1994–5. However, only a fraction of the total number of returnees expected (31,589 to be exact) ever actually returned, at least with the assistance of official humanitarian efforts (UNHCR 1996).

It was not only the failure of totals to materialize that plagued the South African repatriation operation. Throughout 1994 and into 1995 the problem of distinguishing between 'economic' migrants and 'genuine refugees' came to be seen as one of the other major problems faced by UNHCR in the organization of Mozambican return from South Africa. Numerous reports surfaced throughout 1994, noting that the vast majority of those Mozambicans whose return was being assisted by UNHCR and its implementing partners were in fact single males. These single males were suspected of being 'labour migrants', rather than 'genuine refugees', who were taking advantage of the opportunity for a free trip home for themselves and for their luggage. In two convoys from South Africa in November of 1994, consisting of a combined total of 183 returnees, 78.6 per cent of all returnees were single males (UNHCR 1994*c*)!

Furthermore, the returnee population from South Africa was attempting to bring back a volume of luggage far in excess of that of the other Mozambican refugee populations being assisted by UNHCR, such as those returning from the camps in Zimbabwe. In a UNHCR mission report to South Africa dated 17 January 1994 the following point was made:

There was considerable discussion on how to deal with 'economic migrants' compared to the more deserving 'refugees' in South Africa. It was suggested that these two groups can be separated based on their stated reason for leaving, what they did in the RSA, and where they lived in the RSA. It seems unlikely that anyone will say they went to the RSA for work once the benefits of being a 'refugee' are known. (UNHCR 1994*a*)

Throughout 1994 and into 1995, UNHCR, its implementing partners, and its Mozambican counterpart Nucleo de Apoio ao Refugiado (NAR) continuously attempted to seek ways to distinguish between 'economic' migrants and 'genuine refugees' in order to focus assistance on the latter. These efforts generally met with limited success. It was believed that most of these economic migrants returned to South Africa after receiving transportation for their baggage, and that often this was a procedure repeated by the same individuals more than once. This so-called 'revolving-door syndrome' was seen as challenging UNHCR's attempt to channel its assistance to those who were regarded as 'really needing it'. This problem also became a concern which increasingly implicated the UNHCR's own public image in the media. In late 1994 the following observations were made in a UNHCR–RSA report on Migrant Labour and the UNHCR Repatriation Operation (RSA/MOZ):

measures to tackle the revolving door syndrome are being taken ... However, and despite our best efforts, it has become evident during the last few months, that the revolving door is close to spinning! Our own observations at the transit facilities, through field-level contact with the local 'network' of community knowledge and from comments and questions directed to us by organizations, agencies and general observers, suggest that the number of single young males traveling with convoys across the border has increased significantly. (UNHCR 1994*b*)

A barrage of reports and assessments ultimately produced an array of different and sometimes contradictory answers and explanations for the unexpected problems and unfulfilled expectations regarding Mozambican repatriation from South Africa. These explanations tended to focus on three different types of factors—*organizational*, *economic*, and *political*.

In one mid-1995 UNHCR–RSA report on 'lessons learnt' the general explanation for the low rates of return was listed as the 'much stronger socio-economic situation in South Africa. Why leave a country where there are plenty of job opportunities, health care and schools?' Secondary issues of importance were interrelated political and organizational ones, namely: the fact that UNHCR had been denied a presence in South Africa until 1991 and had only created a field presence in refugee areas as late as 1994, and the weakness and inexperience of (South African-based) implementing partners. Nevertheless, and in a somewhat contradictory vein, the same report also commented that 'the operation contained strong elements of information campaign and well-functioning logistics structure, in reality door-to-door service...' (UNHCR 1995*c*).

Another report prepared on the basis of informal fieldwork by a UNHCR official in South Africa in mid-1994 concluded that the low rate of Mozambican participation in UNHCR repatriation efforts was in large part a matter of timing. Mozambicans were reported as struggling, under the adversity of their illegal status, to earn enough in South Africa in order to be able to re-establish their homesteads when they finally did return to Mozambique. Those who returned before being 'fully prepared' in terms of having sufficient resources for fully re-establishing their homesteads reportedly returned to South Africa highly discouraged. These individuals in turn influenced others to delay or forgo their own plans to return. The same report listed other reasons for non-return as uncertainty over the political climate, fear of corruption and landmines, and the extreme degree of trauma that some had suffered in Mozambique leading them to desire a total cut-off with their past (Rodgers 1994).

Other reports produced other explanations such as a lack of knowledge about how to go about registering for repatriation assistance or even of the existence of these services (UNHCR 1994*d*). One report stated that South African farmers and industries had organized misinformation campaigns about the state of political and economic affairs back in order to protect their source of inexpensive Mozambican labour (UNHCR 1994*e*). These reports called for better public education and information. However only a few months later (February 1995) another mission dismissed this factor as irrelevant to the low rate of Mozambican participation in organized return from South Africa, stating that:

The refugee communities are 100% fully aware of the end date for the repatriation operation ... it was interesting to note that throughout the whole mission *none of the old reasons (emphasis in the original)* (political uncertainty in Mozambique, physical security, mines, banditry, food security, elections in the RSA and in Mozambique, the planting season and harvest etc. etc.) were presented by the refugees as to why they couldn't return to their places of origin. (UNHCR 1995*b*)

The overall degree of confusion and uncertainty over 'what went wrong' in the South African repatriation effort was perhaps most revealingly articulated in the final report on the Reintegration Program's Evaluation Mission for Mozambique's Southern region:

The operation in the South was geared for an expected high number of refugees returning from South Africa. This did not happen. However, the reasons for the 'no show' of an estimated 200,000 plus Mozambicans expected to return from the RSA have been well documented and debated long into the night! The question that comes out in the end is, how did the UNHCR get its estimates so wrong? Perhaps not a question for this evaluation team? (UNHCR 1996)

The one striking commonality in all of the explanations of why refugees refused to return was the degree to which kinetic assumptions implicitly informed their analysis. All of the factors that were analysed—organizational, political, and economic—were treated as aspects of the environment, which were seen as acting *upon* refugees. Expectations that refugees would return to Mozambique from South Africa after the war were generated from an analysis of changes in the political climate and the

negotiation of a military settlement. When people did not 'react' to 'peace' by returning as expected explanations were sought in other macro-environmental differences such as those in the organizational structure of intervening institutions, or the larger economic settings within which migration took place.

There was never, however, any examination of differences that in a heuristic sense might be seen as 'internal' to the refugees themselves—for example, those aspects of social organization that might differentiate these refugees from others and affect their movement choices. Culturally defined differences in gender relations, socio-economic organization and the division of labour, in household and co-residence structure, and the ways in which interrelationships among these factors might inform *the agency* of these particular refugees—all remained virtually unexamined. Moreover, no investigation was made of whether transformations in pre-war baselines of social and economic organization might have played a role in shaping patterns of return.

The humanitarian community's framing of the very problem of 'return' itself was structured by assumptions that critically misled their analysis, at least as it applied to the Machazian population. In particular the options of 'return' and 'non-return' were implicitly structured as mutually exclusive options. This understanding informed their concern with the 'revolving door' syndrome and their attempts to define 'refugees' and 'economic migrants' as separate categories.

## Machazian men's understandings of 'return'

The ideas about 'return' to Mozambique that shaped the behaviour of most Machazian men stood in stark contrast to the understandings that shaped the humanitarian relief community's efforts. To most Machazian men living in the peri-urban townships in South Africa, returning to Machaze was generally not seen as an option that was as mutually exclusive as the option of maintaining a household in South Africa.

The cash-dependence and high cost-of-living in the South African townships continued to make the possibility of an eventual option of re-establishment in Mozambique well-worth preserving. A concern with rising violence in the townships throughout the 1980s, and after 1990, the increased targeting of foreigners in township crime, heightened their interest in re-establishing Mozambican residential options. Moreover, the illegality of their status in South Africa made Machazian men vulnerable to crime, given that it was known that they would not report it to authorities. It also made them vulnerable to extortion on the part of corrupt officials.

Yet the very possibility of men pursuing their life strategies in Machaze had been premised for decades on the possibility of working in South Africa. The wartime devastation of Mozambique and these men's continuing uncertainties about the post-war political situation in the country only reinforced the importance of links to economic options in South Africa after the war. However, in contrast to the time period preceding the war, many of these men no longer saw South Africa as, necessarily, merely a place of employment, nor Machaze as the only place in which to constitute families and long term or even permanent forms of residence. For

Machazian men South Africa had become a location in which to potentially pursue a 'total social life' that paralleled and complemented, rather than simply contributed to, their social lives back in Machaze.

The most important factor in reconfiguring Machazian men's understandings of the meaning of 'return' was the wartime emergence of strategies of 'transnational polygyny' (Lubkemann 2000c). In a 1997 survey of over 200 Machazian men engaged in non-mine employment and resident in the South African townships, 23 per cent were involved in conjugal relations only in Mozambique, 26 per cent were involved in conjugal relations only in South Africa, *while 37 per cent were involved in conjugal relations in both South Africa and Mozambique*. Another 2 per cent were involved in conjugal relations in three countries (South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe) (Lubkemann 2000a, 448–9).

The transnationalization of polygynous marriage has radically transformed the meaning of marriage for Machazian men (and women).<sup>7</sup> Pre-war polygynous marriage was used by men to ensure the quality and success of those aspects of their life strategies that had been exclusively carried out in Machaze. These aspects included their concerns with reproduction, labour, comfort, and security in old age and eventual retirement, and the struggle with other men for social status in the local community. In this sense 'marriage' (polygynous or otherwise) dealt with men's 'Machaze-specific' problems.

Transnationalized polygyny after the war was used by men to ensure that all aspects of their life strategies, including those that they used to pursue exclusively in Machaze, could also be pursued in South Africa. By maintaining households in both South Africa and in Mozambique men engaged in transnational polygyny diversified the risks to their life strategies.

In one extreme case one Machazian man whom I interviewed in 1996 had four wives living in three different countries. Two of his wives lived in Machaze, another lived in South Africa, and a fourth one lived in Zimbabwe. In Machaze his wives each tended *maachambas* and his son engaged in trading activity with products, which he brought or occasionally sent back from South Africa. He himself did odd jobs on occasion for an international humanitarian organization that was active in Machaze district after the war. In Zimbabwe another wife (originally from Machaze) traded in the market and lived with another son who was an artisan selling his stone carvings to tourists. In South Africa, he shared his house with a Xhosa woman who had never been to Mozambique and who at the time was working as a part-time domestic worker. Two of his sons also lived in South Africa, the younger one with him tending to his small 'tuck shop' (one room convenience store). Another wife who had lived in yet another location, the city of Chimoio in Mozambique, had died the previous year!

Men such as this one, used transnational polygyny to ensure that their entire life-course strategies were not necessarily vulnerable to any one national context's political or economic instability. The meaning of polygyny and of the institution of marriage had thus changed in a significant way for men, becoming the central and indispensable form of relationship that enabled their new risk-diversification strategies.

Such men have reconfigured their lives in ways that are premised on the idea that 'total social lives' in Machaze and in South Africa are *not* mutually exclusive options. To 'return' to Machaze for these men is not necessarily (or even likely) a matter of 'leaving' South Africa, even in the same way that it was for Machazian men prior to the war. One interviewee explained the difference in his own perspectives prior to and following the war in this manner:

S: 'Before the war I had two stores here (in South Africa) but I always was thinking of going back to Machaze ... I would have taken my (South African) wife with me or else she would have stayed if she refused to come when I went ... Now I must also go back (to Machaze) because that is my place of origin ... I want to set up a tuck shop there. I will still have this tuck shop and house here (in South Africa) and must come back also because I must collect my pension (myself) ... In Machaze food and firewood are free. (But) my children (two sons and a daughter) are also here and they are married here and so I must have a house here too and this (South African) wife who must stay here.'

The terms in which these men conceived of and enacted their own lives thus defied the hegemonic pretensions of an international political system that privileges the idea that citizens 'belong' to one and only one nation state and which strives to map this exclusivity onto the residence, social lives, legal status, and often the economic activity of populations. Clearly, from the perspective of those Machazian men involved in transnationally polygynous unions, the assumptions of the humanitarian community and of regional national governments that posit 'return' and 'non-return' as mutually exclusive options, did not capture the reality to which they aspired. Machazian men were highly resistant to the imposition of state-level notions of 'return' which threatened to 'displace' them from their own pretended transnational life-strategies. This resistance was evidenced in the low rate of participation in official UNHCR return efforts, in the preference for self-organized return beyond the pale of official scrutiny, and in the 'revolving door syndrome' as men continuously crossed back into South Africa (Lubkemann 2000*c*).

By ignoring the culturally informed agency of Machazian men and privileging macro-political factors in their explanations of migration behaviour, kinetic approaches implicitly reproduce the hegemonic socio-political pretensions of the international state system in their very terms of analysis and identification of the object of study. Consequently analysis comes to be structured in terms of a series of a priori mutually exclusive dichotomies such as 'internally displaced'/'refugee' (similar to 'internal'/'international' migration); 'economic migrant'/'refugee' ('voluntary'/'involuntary' migration) and 'returnee'/'stayee'. Ranger's deconstruction of the implications embedded in one of these dichotomies is more broadly generalizable to all of them:

The concept of 'repatriation' derives from the idea of a 'patria' and this in turn implies that an individual's primary identity, rights and obligations derive from the membership of a 'nation'. The nation encapsulates 'home' in terms of language, culture, rights to citizenship and land. Yet this is precisely what is at stake in many countries which generate refugees and returnees ... Even where the idea of return to one's 'country' is a national as well as a local sentiment, that

idea co-exists and sometimes conflicts with many other senses of identity and entitlement ... Any study of return needs, therefore, to look closely at such multiple ideas of identity and entitlement. (Ranger 1994: 289)

While these dichotomies reflect and reproduce the pretensions of a global system based on the 'hegemony of the state' (Young 1994) they clearly fail to represent the understandings to which migrants themselves are often primarily responsive in shaping their own behaviour as both others (Hansen 1982, 1992; Harrell-Bond 1986; Daley 1991; Allen and Turton 1996; Bascom 1996, 1998; Indra 1999) and this analysis show. These categorizations are critical ones in determining how displaced people are engaged by larger state and international-level political actors. Such definitions affect how larger political power is formulated and exercised through policies that determine: who receives assistance or conversely is targeted for coercive measures; the legality of resettlement status; the ascription of civil and even human rights; and the division and assignment of spheres of governmental and civil responsibility and of non-involvement.

Demographers must be attentive to how these systems of classification generally reflect and reproduce the hegemonic pretensions of an international system based on the idea of the state as the 'natural' social entity, rather than the social or economic realities which forced migrants perceive they must respond to. Inasmuch as demographic processes are the result of socially and culturally situated challenges to these pretensions, demographers should reassess their use of analytical categories that derive from and reinforce them. Clearly, the a priori application of these dichotomies ultimately fails to adequately account for the empirically observed patterns of behaviour observed on the ground.

## DEVELOPING 'AGENCY-RICH' APPROACHES TO ANALYSING CRISIS MIGRATION

In order to understand the way in which so-called forced-migration decisions are made analysis must attempt to 'situate' migration (Greenhalgh 1995). Migration must be situated in a first sense that refers to its position as *a particular option among an array of other options* for responding to a complex and multidimensional environment as experienced by culturally and socially differentiated actors. Thus understanding the meaning and causes of wartime migration as an option also requires that it be studied relative to its alternatives, *including therefore the study of non-migration options*. It thus proposes that the study of migration in crisis contexts must include the investigation of non-migrants and thus of a larger population than that which have been typically studied in the analysis of so-called forced migration.

The array of options perceived and weighed by actors must be examined in light of the social roles and cultural understandings *of the varied social categories of actors* involved in making these decisions. Rather than assuming that the actors involved in decision-making perceive no other options other than migration this alternative

approach empirically investigates which options they do perceive and the cultural terms in which such understandings are cast.

In this approach the analytical focus shifts from how the environment constrains actor volition ('forced' migration) to how actor agency is exercised in an environment of changing qualities and characteristics. Rather than understanding violence as having uniform characteristics for all of those who are exposed to it, an understanding of the environment's 'quality', and thus by extension of a sense of crisis itself is assumed to be defined in socially specific ways. What movement or non-movement itself implies in terms of the life strategies and strategies for engaging in multiple forms of social struggle is differentiated among categories as social actors. As the Machazian case demonstrates women may perceive aspects of the environment as deteriorating while men perceive them as stable or as rendering positive new opportunities. Non-migration may be more attractive to those with higher socio-economic status or local political power, while the opposite may be true of those with lower socio-economic status. Furthermore the multidimensionality of life strategies and of social roles implies that an individual's own interests may be contradictory and ambiguous. Migration and non-migration decisions must be analysed as the result of culturally and socially situated actors' attempts to negotiate, use, and react to forces impinging on their lives with categories meaningful to them in formulating action. It is thus necessary to examine the whole array of concerns of socially specific categories of actors and their interrelationships.

Migration must also be understood as 'situated' in a second sense—as implicated in a specific array of social struggles that are likely to differ immensely from context to context. As this case study shows, at an individual level, migration may serve simultaneously as a tactic employed in struggles against state authority, for subsistence, in intergenerational contests for power within kinship networks, and in struggles over the rights and responsibilities that different marriage partners have towards each other.

While highlighting the issue of power differences in determining outcomes (as Richmond and others have pointed out, it is crucial in the analysis of 'forced migration'), this re-formulation relocates the analytical place where power differences are analysed. It examines power as a matter of difference *between agents* in their ability to influence the effects of their actions and others' reactions on interactional outcomes, rather than as a matter of difference *within individuals* in the degree to which they exercise their own will in making choices.

At a structural level migration's significance must be examined in light of an understanding of the full array of processes of social contestation in which it is implicated within a society. Migration's historical development as a strategy used in multiple forms of social and political struggle shaped the changing structure and meanings of migration itself in Machaze in critical ways throughout the century. It is only by understanding migration's implication in this full array of social struggles, that the factors that shaped wartime migration decision-making and produced gendered patterns of demographic redistribution can be accurately assessed. Such an approach demands a historical perspective that analyses the course of social process

prior to the migratory and non-migratory processes of most specific interest. It thus challenges the deployment of frameworks that delimit the temporal parameters of analysis in terms of a 'refugee cycle'—of flight, various stages of resettlement, and finally adaptation (Stein 1981). Finally, it suggests that rather than being treated as an abnormality in the course of normal social process (as structural–functionalist anthropology in southern Africa was meant to do) crisis itself should be reinserted into the broader study of social process (Ranger 1994; Bascom 1998).

## CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MIGRATION THEORY

Richmond's prescription for theories of international migration can be applied more broadly to what all migration analysis should be capable of addressing:

theories of international migration (including refugees) should be capable of explaining the scale, direction and composition of population movements that cross state boundaries, the factors which determine the decision to move and the choice of destination, the characteristic modes of integration in the receiving country and the eventual outcome, including remigration and return movement. (Richmond 1988: 7)

In those 'theories' that aim to be applicable to a wide variety of migration processes there is a tendency to focus on factors of analysis that are deemed to be non-context specific. The objective of theory building in this mode is to identify universally applicable variables. Explanations are sought by drawing comparisons and looking for differences in factors that are assumed to operate under structurally similar principles and terms regardless of context—such as the macro-political or economic factors, or the organizational structure and procedures of humanitarian organizations or other international institutions.

Once the analyst is familiar with the terms of analysis and relevant principles by which such factors are assumed by the theory to universally operate, he or she knows to and can selectively focus on identifying these, and only these, aspects of any particular context in constructing an explanation, while disregarding the rest of that context as irrelevant 'noise'. In practice, this type of analysis involves approaching any specific context or problem with a set of pre-established variables that are assumed to be applicable to the problem at hand (as to any other problem of the same order). In other words the analyst already assumes that he or she knows which variables are relevant.

By contrast I argue that migration must be studied as a process situated in culturally specific forms of social struggle. An approach that emphasizes the need to consider socio-cultural factors, suggests that it in some sense it is impossible to know a priori all the relevant variables that matter in shaping behaviour. The terms of some of those variables must be defined and understood at a much more context-specific level since they apply only in that context itself. An approach that emphasizes the need to consider socio-cultural factors, suggests that it in some sense it is impossible to know a priori all the relevant variables that matter in shaping behaviour. In fact

the assumption that guides such an approach is that the researcher's own social and cultural difference precludes him or her from knowing to a large extent what all the variables that will be relevant even are—that is, he or she does not even know what he or she does not know. The terms of some of those variables (transnational polygyny, *uloi*, etc.) must be identified and understood at a much more context-specific level since they apply only in that context itself. By implication I am suggesting that universal theories of migration processes are not really possible—since those processes, and thus the ‘work’ migration is doing, differs in significant ways from case to case (Bjeren 1997: 221).

The development of an approach that thoroughly integrates cultural specificity into the analysis of forced migration suggests that we devise a ‘theory of method’ rather than a theory of universally applicable variables. In such an approach, the investigation of the specific socio-cultural configurations in any given context becomes part of the standard operating procedures for analysis. What therefore becomes standardized is a methodological approach used to identify relevant variables, rather than merely a set of pre-defined variables themselves.

At the broadest level the prescription for such an approach involves the identification and analysis of social struggles as the central focus in what must be more than simply a study of migration patterns or movement decision-making, but must in fact be a study of social process. It prescribes the empirical identification and privileging in analysis of ‘key social struggles’ in specific contexts. ‘Key social struggles’ are those that have historically served as the critical lines for defining the way in which power is distributed and social differentiation is culturally constituted in specific contexts of social interaction.

This approach thus appropriates and extends Geertz's (1973) notion of ‘thick description’ by examining how symbols and practices are given meaning not only by how they are suspended in webs of other symbols, but also how they are implicated in power configurations and contestations over power. In identifying the range of key social struggles and their structural interrelationships, the cultural terms of their expression, and the historical genealogies of their production and transformation, this approach delineates the field of power relations in which migration is situated as a strategy for engagement.

Migration itself is investigated primarily as a strategy for engaging in these social struggles as they occur in a particular power field. The analytical focus is thus on migration not as an ‘end’ but as a ‘means’. Too often ‘demographic behaviour’ is studied as if it were an end in and of itself in what is an inaccurate projection of a discipline's categories onto the interests of actual subjects. Social scientists must thus identify the intentions of actors in order to avoid conflating disciplinary focus with actor intentionality. People migrate in order to accomplish other goals. They do not move in order to migrate, much less be tallied in the migration column of a social scientists study. Movement is ultimately a ‘side-effect’ of, or ‘means’ to, the other culturally defined projects of socially specific agents.

Migration is thus best conceptualized as a means to engage in other projects, thus suggesting that those projects themselves should be the central focus for research and

analysis. In this sense there is no 'demographic' behaviour in the sense of behaviour directed solely at those aspects that interest demographers (anymore than there is 'anthropological' or 'cultural' behaviour in this same sense that behaviour is generally not undertaken with the goal of actually constituting culture).

A 'theory of method' in this vein is also critically reflexive, in that it presumes that the methods, concepts, and theories that are being used must be constantly subject to critical scrutiny. It assumes that they are not only vulnerable to continuous reinterpretation and revision but *should* also suffer such revision as new cultural insights emerge and more social differentiation is identified. It is suspicious if there are no surprises when cultural difference is investigated. Such theoretical reflexivity should operate at all levels of analysis ranging from how data is collected, to how it is subject to reinterpretation after collection, to the constant reconsideration of our categories and larger theoretical concepts.

## Notes

1. In privileging macro-political processes these analyses arguably admit a narrow 'political' basis for migrant agency as relevant to the analysis of migratory patterns and outcomes. Yet this agency only influences migratory outcomes indirectly, since it is exercised with the intention of engaging in macro-political contests rather than with the intent of directing migration *per se*. The decision to migrate is not made as a 'political act' (i.e. in order to, and as a way to, support one political faction or the other) but only as a result of a prior political act (supporting one faction or another) in which migration was not directly a considered objective.
2. Richmond explicitly draws on the concept of 'agency' used by Anthony Giddens. According to Giddens, 'Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place (which is why agency implies power)' (1984: 96). He argues that 'agency refers to "doing" ' whether with intended or unintended consequences (1984: 97), arguing that agency thus encompasses what an actor does in the sense of the fact that 'what happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened' (1984: 96). Frankly, this definition does not seem to separate 'agency' from 'action' itself, or even at times in his argument, from 'outcomes'. A notion of 'agency' that distinguishes it from 'action' is better served by two of the meanings that Sciulli (1986) has identified as characterizing Parson's notion of 'voluntaristic action', namely: 'the capacity to make choices despite constraints; and a capacity for self-initiated action whether or not this capacity is realized'.
3. The research on which this study is based was conducted with people all of whom originally came from Machaze district prior to the war. Some of those interviewed (1996–7) had remained in the district or returned to it after the war. I also interviewed others who had resettled the town of Chimoio in Mozambique, and in two township areas south of Johannesburg in South Africa. The methods employed in researching these questions included informal interviews and forms of participant observation along with extensive oral life-history interviews, life-history matrix and other forms of surveys, and review of quarterly and annual historical documentation (primarily from colonial administration) on a district level dating back to 1898 (Lubkemann 2000*a*).

4. The exact gender distribution of the wartime population is difficult to determine because of the difficulty of reconstructing a population dispersed and decimated by over a decade of war. However, several sources of independent evidence all establish that the gender difference in population distribution was at the very least dramatic. The 1980 census which took place in Machaze as the war was underway (and was actually interrupted by it) verified a female to male ration in the district of 1.6 : 1 (GTZ 1995). A 1993 survey of the population in several communal villages counted only 2,087 men in the 16–64 age group, with almost twice as many women (3,839) (GTZ 1993). In my own 1997 survey of over 200 Machazian household in South Africa I found that only fewer than 5% had a Machazian wife present (Lubkemann 2000a: 432). Prior to the unfortunate disposal of most records at the UNHCR district office at the time of the organization's departure, I was able to obtain a sample of these records for over 5,000 different returnees, from several different convoys. For purposes of this chapter I drew on a subsample of 123 households from the official UNHCR return convoys from Tongogara to Machaze in early 1996. More could easily be examined at a later date. In my subsample I found that a total of forty-six households were classified as female-headed along with six solo females—which if counted together comprise 42% of the total returnee households in these convoys. Two other studies, one conducted in Tongogara camp (of which Machazians were only a part of the total camp population) (Tandai 1992) and one in Machaze itself (CARE 1994) both verified high levels of female-headed households (Tandai—20%; CARE—30%). In the CARE study only 2% of households that were not female-headed had no adult women in the household.
5. It is important to note that the Mozambican civil war spanned nearly a decade and a half. It would be naïve to assume that change in 'everyday' social process was suspended or stood still during such a long time period. Despite the fact that most major displacement-producing civil wars in Africa have persisted for at least this long (Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, and Eritrea), most analysis of forced migration still tends to conceptualize displacement as a momentary 'event' that is a disruption in the normal course of life rather than as a long term and sadly enough, even trans-generational process 'process'.
6. It is important to point out that this survey highlights the situation in 1997 and not necessarily throughout the 1980s when the war was in full swing.
7. Primarily due to space limitations I have focused in this chapter on men's life strategies. In both my dissertation and elsewhere (Lubkemann 2000a, 2002) I deal with Machazian women's strategies at length. Ultimately both migration organization during the war and refashioned marital roles and relations must be analysed as the outcome of negotiations between and involving *both* men and women. Machazian women have by no means remained passive towards the transnationalization of polygyny given the generally negative implications for their own social and economic status that this development has implied. Furthermore, women have also exploited opportunities presented by wartime circumstances to innovate in the development of social relations in ways that represent bids to enhance their own position relative to men and spouses.

## References

- Allen, T. and Turton, D. (1996). 'Introduction', in T. Allen (ed.), *In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 1–22.
- Bascom, J. (1998). *Losing Place: Refugees and Rural Transformations in East Africa*. New York: Berghahn.

- (1996). 'Reconstituting households and reconstituting home areas', in T. Allen (ed.), *In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight, and Homecoming in Northeast Africa*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 66–79.
- Berry, S. (1993). *No Condition is Permanent*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Bjeren, G. (1997). 'Gender and reproduction' in T. Hammar, G. Brochmann, K. Tamas and T. Faist (eds.), *International Migration, Immobility and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. New York: Berg Press.
- Black, R. and Robinson, V. (eds.) (1993). *Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change*. New York: Bellhaven Press.
- Bozzoli, B. (1991a). *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy and Migrancy in South Africa 1900–1983*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- (1991b). 'The meaning of informal work: some women's stories', in C. Rogerson and E. Preston-Whyte (eds.), *South Africa's Informal Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–33.
- CARE (1994). *Baseline Nutritional Survey-Machaze District (March, 1994)*. Maputo, Mozambique: CARE.
- Colson, E. (1971). *The Social Consequences of Resettlement*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- (1999). 'Gendering those uprooted by development', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 23–39.
- Crush, J., Jeeves, A., and Yudelman, D. (1991). *South Africa's Labor Empire: A History of Black Migrancy to the Gold Mines*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Daley, P. (1991). 'Gender, displacement and social reproduction: settling Burundi refugees in Western Tanzania', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4(3): 248–66.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *Power/Knowledge*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Fischer, P., Martin, R., and Straubhaar, T. (1997). 'Should I stay or should I go?', in T. Hammar, G. Brochmann, K. Tamas, and T. Faist (eds.), *International Migration, Immobility and Development*. New York: Berg, pp. 49–90.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gilad, L. (1999). 'The problem of gender-related persecution: a challenge of international protection', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 334–42.
- Giles, W. (1999). 'Gendered violence in war: reflections on transnationalist and comparative frameworks in militarized conflict zones', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 83–93.
- Greenhalgh, S. (1995). 'Anthropology and fertility: culture, history, gender, and power in reproductive life', in S. Greenhalgh (ed.), *Situating Fertility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GTZ (1993). *Projecto de Reintegracao, Reassentamento e Reconstrucao do Distrito de Mossurize*. Chimoio, Mozambique: GTZ-MAARP.
- (1995). *Manica Province, Mozambique: Population Structures and Migration: Modern Development Trends*. Osnabruck, Germany: GTZ.
- (1996). *Conflict Driven Migration, Post-Conflict Reintegration, and Rehabilitation 1984–1996*. Chimoio, Mozambique: GTZ-MAARP.
- Hansen, A. (1982). 'Self-settled rural refugees in Africa: the case of Angolans in Zambian villages', in A. Hansen and A. Oliver-Smith (eds.), *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, pp. 13–36.

- Hansen, A. (1992). 'The long-term consequences of two African refugee resettlement strategies', in M. Hopkins and N. Donnelly (eds.), *Selected Papers on Refugee Issues II*. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association, Arlington, VA.
- Harrell-Bond, B. (1986). *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Indra, D. (1999). "'Not a room of one's own' engendering forced migration knowledge and practice', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 1–22.
- Kertzer, D. (1997). 'The proper role of culture in demographic explanation', in G. Jones, M. Douglas, C. Caldwell, and M. D'Souza (eds.), *The Continuing Demographic Transition*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Koenig, D. (1995). 'Women and resettlement', in R. Gallin, A. Ferguson, and J. Harper (eds.), *The Woman and International Development Annual*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 21–9.
- Krufeld, R. M. (1994). 'Buddhism, maintenance, and change: reinterpreting gender in a Lao refugee community', in R. M. Krufeld and L. A. Camino (eds.), *Reconstructing Lives, Recapturing Meaning: Refugee Identity, Gender, and Culture Change*. Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Publishers, pp. 97–128.
- Kunz, E. (1973). 'The refugee in flight: kinetic models and forms of displacement', *International Migration Review*, 7: 125–46.
- (1981). 'Exile and resettlement: refugee theory', *International Migration Review*, 15: 42–51.
- Lubkemann, S. (2000a). *Situating Wartime Migration in Central Mozambique: Gendered Social Struggle and the Transnationalization of Polygyny*. Ph.D. Dissertation for the Brown University Department of Anthropology, Providence, RI.
- (2000b). 'Other motives, other struggles: gender politics and the shaping of wartime migration in Mozambique', in E. Godziak and D. J. Shandy (eds.), *Rethinking Refuge and Displacement: Selected Papers on Refugees and Immigrants*, Vol. VIII, 2000. Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association, pp. 343–68.
- (2000c). 'The transformation of transnationality among Mozambican migrants in South Africa', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 34(1): 41–63.
- (2002). 'Where to be an ancestor? Reconstituting socio-spiritual worlds and post-conflict settlement decision-making among displaced Mozambicans', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 15(2): 89–212.
- Malkki, L. (1995). *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Matlou, P. (1999). 'Upsetting the cart: forced migration and gender issues, the African experience', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 128–45.
- McSpadden, M. A. (1999). 'Negotiating masculinity in the reconstruction of social place: Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in the United States and Sweden', in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering Forced Migration: Theory and Practice*. New York: Berghahn, pp. 242–60.
- Moussa, H. (1993). *Storm and Sanctuary: The Journey of Ethiopian and Eritrean Women Refugees*. Dundas, Ontario: Artemis Press.
- and McSpadden, A. (1996). 'Returning home? the decision-making processes of Eritrean women and men', in H. Moussa Giles and Van Esterlik (eds.), *Development and Diaspora: Gender and the Refugee Experience*. Dundas, Ontario: Artemis Press.
- Oliver-Smith, A. and Hansen A. (1982). 'Involuntary migration and resettlement: causes and contexts', in A. Hansen and A. Oliver-Smith (eds.), *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 1–12.

- Preston-Whyte, E. (1991). 'Invisible workers: domestic service and the informal economy', in C. Rogerson and E. Preston-Whyte (eds.), *South Africa's Informal Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 34–53.
- Ranger, T. (1994). 'Studying repatriation as part of African social history', in T. Allen and H. Morsink (eds.), *When Refugees Go Home*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Richmond, A. (1988). 'Sociological theories of international migration: the case of refugees', *Current Sociology*, 36(2): 7–26.
- (1994). *Global Apartheid*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rodgers, G. (1994). 'Mozambican refugees' attitudes to repatriation from South Africa', Nelspruit, South Africa: UNHCR.
- Rogge, J. (ed.) (1987). *Refugees: A Third World Dilemma*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Schlemmer, L. and Moller, V. (1985). 'Constraint, stress and reaction: the responses of migrant contract workers to their situation', in H. Gilomee and L. Schlemmer (eds.), *Up Against The Fences*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 167–92.
- Scott, J. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sciulli, D. (1986). 'Voluntaristic action as a distinct concept: theoretical foundations of societal constitutionalism', *American Sociological Review*, 51(6): 743–66.
- Scudder, T. and Colson, E. (1982). 'From welfare to development: a conceptual framework for the analysis of dislocated people', in A. Hansen and A. Oliver-Smith (eds.), *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 267–87.
- Smit, P. (1985). 'The process of black urbanization', in H. Gilomee and L. Schlemmer (eds.), *Up Against The Fences*. New York: St Martin's Press, pp. 114–25.
- Sommers, M. (2001). *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania*. New York: Berghaha Books.
- Stein, B. (1981). 'The refugee experience: defining the parameters of a field of study', *International Migration Review*, 15(1): 320–30.
- Tandai, S. (1992). *Mozambican Refugees: Preparing for Repatriation*. Harare, Zimbabwe: CIES/School of Social Work.
- UNHCR (1994a). *Mission Report to RSA (Logistics Officer-Maputo), January 17, 1994*. Maputo, Mozambique: UNHCR.
- (1994b). *Migrant Labour and the UNHCR Repatriation Operation (RSA/MOZ), December 1994*. Giyani, South Africa: UNHCR.
- (1994c). *File Note—Economic Migrants and the RSA Repatriation Operation, November 25, 1994*. Giyani, South Africa: UNHCR.
- (1994d). *Report on Mission to South Africa, March 3, 1994*. Maputo, Mozambique: UNHCR Regional Program Office for Women and Children.
- (1994e). *Report on UNHCR Meeting in Nelspruit, South Africa, May 27, 1994*. Maputo, Mozambique: UNHCR.
- (1995a). *Mozambique: Repatriation and Reintegration of Mozambican Refugees—Progress Report, June 8, 1995*. Maputo, Mozambique: UNHCR.
- (1995b). *Mission Report—Joint NAR/UNHCR/Moz. Gov't Mission to RSA, February 14, 1995*. Maputo, Mozambique: UNHCR.
- (1995c). *Note for the File: Lessons Learnt—Voluntary Repatriation of Mozambicans from RSA*. Giyani, South Africa: UNHCR.
- (1996). *Reintegration Programme in the Southern Region Report, March 26, 1996*. Mozambique: UNHCR.
- Wilson, K. (1994). 'Refugees and returnees as social agents', in T. Allen and H. Morsink (eds.), *When Refugees Go Home*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 237–50.

- Wilson, K. and Nunes, J. (1994). 'Repatriation to Mozambique', in T. Allen and H. Morsink (eds.), *When Refugees Go Home*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, pp. 167–236.
- Young, C. (1994). *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Zolberg, A., Suhrke, A., and Aguayo, S. (1989). *Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.