

Where To Be An Ancestor? Reconstituting Socio-Spiritual Worlds Among Displaced Mozambicans

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This paper examines the effect of spiritual beliefs and local religious institutions on displaced Mozambicans' strategies for reconstituting 'social worlds' (Marx 1990) which incorporate ancestral spirits. It examines how wartime violence was perceived to affect these 'socio-spiritual worlds' and how wartime social change infused post-conflict resettlement choices with specific 'socio-spiritual dilemmas'. It adapts Hirschman's (1970) classic typology of 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty' responses to organizational change to develop an analytical framework for understanding the types of options that are pursued to resolve these dilemmas and reconstitute socio-spiritual worlds. Finally, it examines the role of social power in determining which options are available to different categories of social actors.

Introduction

This article examines how culturally-specific religious beliefs factor into the complex configuration of often conflicting social, economic and political imperatives that forced migrants negotiate in rebuilding their social worlds (Marx 1990) in the aftermath of prolonged civil strife. None of the analytical frameworks that have been proposed for explaining how refugees organize, experience and cope with displacement (Kunz 1973, 1981; Scudder and Colson 1982; Oliver-Smith and Hansen, 1982; Marx 1990; Richmond 1994; Cernea 1996; Peteet, 1995; Bascom 1998; Ahearn 2000; Eastmond 2000) address religious beliefs and institutions as mediating factors. A number of important works have drawn attention to the ways in which spiritual beliefs and religious institutions shape and organize wartime violence (Lan 1983; Wilson 1992; Alexander 1994; Richards 1996; Ellis 1999; Behrand 1999), yet far fewer studies (Wilson 1994; Peteet 1995; Sommers, 2001) have considered how spiritual beliefs influence the displacement experiences produced by that violence. While a growing body of case studies document the social (Daley 1991; Omidian 1996; Kibreab 1995; Bascom 1998; McSpadden 1999; Matsuoka and Sorenson 1999; Lubkemann 2000c), economic (Chambers 1986; Hansen 1993; Kuhlman 1994; Bascom 1998; Sommers 2001; Indra 2000), and political (Malkki, 1995;

Stepputat 1999) effects of displacement, the effects of forced migration on spiritual beliefs and forms of organized religious life remain sparsely scrutinized (Krulfeld 1994).

This article examines how spiritual beliefs and local religious institutions influenced the way in which war-affected Mozambicans experienced displacement and formulated strategies for reconstituting their 'social worlds' (Marx 1990). Fieldwork for this study was conducted between 1996 and 1999 with Mozambicans who originally, before the war, lived in the south-central district of Machaze (in Manica province), but were resident after the conflict in three different locations: those who had fled to a peri-urban township in South Africa; those who had moved internally to the provincial capital, Chimoio; and those who had remained in (or returned to) the district of origin itself, Machaze. Research methods in this study included informal interviews, participant observation, over 90 extensive oral life history interviews, several surveys, and review of district-level reports dating from 1898–1995.

In the aftermath of the Mozambican civil war those displaced from Machaze attempted to reconstitute disrupted social relations they perceived as critical to the successful realization of their life strategies. These social networks were believed to include the spirits of the dead. After the war, Machazians¹ sought to expunge the threat of violence from all forms of social relationships including the 'socio-spiritual'. Wartime violence, migration, and social fragmentation were believed to have infused new dangers into interaction between the dead and the living. Moreover, Machazian beliefs that ancestral spirits had both vested interests of their own, as well as interests in all forms of social interaction among the living, proved particularly important in shaping post-conflict behaviour because novel forms of tension had been introduced into social interaction by wartime changes in domestic and kinship relations. In the aftermath of wartime violence and displacement, Machazians thus sought to re-constitute what might be termed 'socio-spiritual worlds' through strategies that were responsive to how wartime violence was perceived to have affected the spiritual world and the intervention of spirits in the lives of the living.

This article establishes a framework for analysing the strategies social actors use to cope with socio-spiritual dilemmas that result from wartime violence and displacement. Drawing and elaborating upon A. O. Hirschman's (1970) well-established typology of 'loyalty', 'voice', and 'exit' options for responding to decline in organizations, this article compares and contrasts the strategies used by different groups of Machazians to respond to and negotiate the perceived socio-spiritual dilemmas presented by different post-conflict resettlement choices: whether to return, not return, or remain in Machaze after the civil war.

A range of strategies used by Machazian men who remained in South Africa after the conflict are contrasted with more radical tactics pursued by a specific subset of displaced Machazian women who chose to settle in the provincial capital of Chimoio after the war. Gendered and other dimensions of social power are shown to play a critical role in making particular strategies 'socially

available’—in the sense of being ratified as legitimate by a larger community—to some categories of social actors and not others. Throughout this article some of the consequences of these developments for the Machazian ‘institutional religious market’ itself are also examined.

Rethinking Social Worlds from a Machazian Perspective

E. Marx (1990) proposed the notion of ‘social world’ as a tool that could transcend the long-standing and increasingly critiqued (Appadurai 1991; Gupta and Ferguson 1997) tendency in the social sciences to imagine ‘society as a territorially based organism’ by focusing instead on the social horizons of interaction. He defined a (migrant’s) social world as: ‘consist[ing] of the sum of all the migrant’s social relationships and the forces impinging on those relationships at any moment’ (Marx 1990: 189). Rather than equating displacement with movement *per se*, the ‘social world’ concept encouraged analysts to empirically examine rather than inherently assume how personal social worlds are affected and transformed by movement. Important examples in which wartime movement actually reinforced or further developed social networks are provided by Ken Wilson’s study of Mozambican Jehovah’s Witnesses in Malawi (Wilson 1994) and Art Hansen’s study of Angolans in Zambia (Hansen 1982, 1993). They prove that wartime *immobility* may paradoxically be far more disempowering, alienating, endangering, and disruptive to social networks and life-strategies than movement (Lubkemann 2000a, 2000c).

In the Machazian case, the ‘social world’ concept has the added advantage of capturing a historical reality in which processes of migration and dispersion that constituted social relations between places (as opposed to within ‘a place’) played a central role in organizing social life. Throughout the twentieth century Machazian subsistence strategies revolved around a social division of labour between female subsistence agriculture confined to Machaze and male migration to Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa in pursuit of wage-labour. Most Machazian men spent long migratory careers working in South Africa, returning after years abroad for stays of several months in Machaze—a pattern often repeated for decades before final retirement in Machaze. In contrast, Machazian women rarely migrated and engaged almost exclusively in subsistence agriculture (Lubkemann 2000a, 2000d). Thus, Machazian ‘social worlds’ were not enacted entirely within delimited territorial boundaries but actually depended upon migratory processes and social networks that continuously spanned international borders and linked several rural and peri-urban environments.

It is also important to understand that Machazians perceived their social worlds to span not only spatial boundaries but spiritual ones as well. Machazians believed that social interaction occurred not only among the living but also between the living and the spirits of the dead. Foremost among these spirits were the *vadzimu*, one’s own deceased ancestors. The *vadzimu* were

believed to intervene in the lives of the living in order to correct moral failings or simply not to be forgotten, usually by causing minor illnesses (rather than grievous harm). This type of *vadzimu* admonishment was believed to occur if the living neglected to perform rituals of respect. However, Machazians also believed that ancestral reproach could easily be ‘triggered’ by contentious relationships among the living. The mere existence of feelings of ill will between social actors was believed to motivate *vadzimu* to act, particularly in defence of the rights of older and senior kin, whose age and social rank conferred on them a status that was ‘closer to the ancestors’. Within this belief system social duties and obligations towards others were often fulfilled to avoid provoking ancestral resentment and not only out of fear that the living offended party might exercise material sanctions directly.

The spirits of the dead were also believed to be potentially the source of more grievous forms of harm, usually through the vehicle of witchcraft (*uloi*). Among Machazians, as among many other Shona-speakers (Bourdillon 1991), all serious illnesses, misfortune, and death were attributed to *uloi*. Such misfortune was believed to be caused by a *mfukwa*,² a particular type or state of spirit motivated to cause death, in conjunction with a specific living actor who either intentionally or unintentionally directed or facilitated the *mfukwa*’s activity. Although *uloi* could be produced through the intentional intervention of ritual specialists, it was also believed that the mere existence of jealousy or intense hostility could open up a path for a *mfukwa* to act. Sometimes a person could unknowingly facilitate *mfukwa* action against another by harbouring hostile sentiments against that person. Alternatively, a *mfukwa* could even pursue his (or his kin’s) own interests rather than those of an inadvertent facilitator. Thus, before the war the spirits of particularly powerful dead chiefs were believed to pursue their own lineages’ interests after death as *mfukwas*. Similarly, during the war those wrongly slain and improperly buried, or the spirits of slain soldiers who were outsiders, were believed to be motivated by reason of their own ‘violent deaths’ to kill, by taking advantage of the ‘paths opened up’ by the hostile sentiments among the living, even if not intentionally summoned to do so.

Machazians consulted *nyangas* and *nyamossolos*,³ two types of ‘traditional’ local healers and diviners, as well as local church *profetas* (prophets) in order to diagnose the sources of social conflict that gave rise to acrimonious socio-spiritual interaction. These specialists were believed capable of identifying which specific spiritual actors caused an illness, of interpreting their intentions and demands vis-à-vis the living, and of interceding with them for resolution. Local chiefs and church pastors also played important roles in mediating social interaction between spiritual and living members of the Machazian social world. At a community level, a loose and historically shifting hierarchy of local chiefs were charged with annual rain and grave cleaning ceremonies held to curry favour with the spirits of dead chiefs—believed to be the ‘genuine owners’ of the land—in order to assure crop prosperity. In the chronically drought ridden area of Machaze this has long been an important role. Meanwhile,

pastors played a significant if highly variable role in ensuring the protective activity of the Holy Spirit in the lives of their parishioners.⁴ All of these institutions reflect the degree to which Machazians perceived themselves to inhabit a space of social interaction that can be described as a 'socio-spiritual world'. Machazian coping strategies during and after the war were consequently responsive to the perceived effects of wartime violence, migration, and social change on the entire array of social relationships within this socio-spiritual world.

The Socio-Spiritual Spiral of Wartime Violence

Shortly after Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, hostile neighbouring apartheid regimes instigated a civil war that lasted almost fifteen years. Machaze was one of the earliest settings for this conflict. By late 1979 the area was fully embroiled in the war between the Rhodesian (and later South African) supported anti-government faction (RENAMO) and the government forces (FRELIMO). Estimates suggest that between 40 per cent and 70 per cent of the population were forced out of the district and migrated to South Africa or Zimbabwe, or were internally displaced within Mozambique during the conflict (GTZ 1993, 1996; CARE 1994; Wenzel and Bannerman 1995). Those who remained within the district were displaced from their homesteads, forced to choose between moving into FRELIMO's fortified communal villages or fleeing deep into the 'bush', nominally under RENAMO's control.

Choices to move into either FRELIMO or RENAMO areas were more often than not unrelated to political sympathies with either of these parties. Rather they reflected the ways in which forms of local social conflict permeated and centrally shaped the military activity of both armed factions in the Machaze area. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO troops and commanders unfamiliar with the area relied on locals to guide them and to identify enemy cadres or collaborators. Machazians became adept at using this type of accusation in order to further private agendas founded in local forms of social strife unrelated to the political agendas of the warring parties—such as jealousy over differential success in labour migration or suspicions of witchcraft. In Machaze, local social divisions tended to occur primarily within kinship groups—often even within households—in part because of cultural beliefs that identify social intimates as the most likely source of rivalry. In contrast to Machaze, elsewhere in Mozambique, ethnicity (Roesch 1992; Geffray 1989), socio-economic class and urban/rural divides (O'Laughlin 1992; Geffray 1989; McGregor 1998; Manning 1998), and intra-community political rivalry among elites (Alexander 1994) played a more prominent role in shaping wartime violence and political alignments.⁵

As the war intensified in Machaze, more and more people took flight in reaction to accusations of political collaboration even though these allegations were mostly spurious. Moreover, many pre-emptively moved in the opposite

direction taken by social rivals in fear of being identified to soldiers in the areas to which the rivals had moved as supporters of the opposition. Thus from the war's outset local social agendas cast in culturally-specific terms strongly influenced the deployment of violence by FRELIMO and RENAMO, and directed it in the service of local micro-political rather than national macro-political ends. Wartime violence in Machaze was thus primarily understood and reacted to as a product of locally generated and defined social conflicts, rather than as a product of political affiliation with RENAMO or FRELIMO *per se*. While a small minority of local FRELIMO cadres and early RENAMO mobilizers may have been motivated by the political projects of the contenders for national power, most residents of Machaze reacted to the way in which that power itself could be manipulated in the service of micro-political projects generated in the cultural logic of local social relations.

Wartime violence in Machaze was further aggravated by the ways in which religious beliefs amplified local social antagonism. Machazians believed that those who suffered violent deaths were likely to become *mfukwas*. The death of soldiers who were 'outsiders' raised the spectre of a proliferation of dangerous unknown *mfukwas* who could randomly intervene to cause death. A more predictable, yet also more constant threat was posed by the intimate relative whose violent death was believed to provoke them to take on a *mfukwa* state. Although wrongful death obligated the living to seek redress, the culturally prescribed institutions for doing so had been enfeebled by targeted post-colonial government repression. Moreover, the impossibility of interacting with the guilty parties (often unknown or else unreachable in the opposing force's area of control) made the negotiation of a settlement with the *mfukwa* all the more difficult if not impossible. Sometimes even proper burials were not viable—another ritual failure thought likely to provoke ancestral virulence. Not only could an irate *mfukwa* threaten its own family members, but its 'presence' placed a family's relationships in the broader community at risk since the *mfukwa* became part of the 'package of actors' brought into social interactions of all forms with other parties. Any form of conflict with a family with a *mfukwa* was believed to be particularly dangerous.

Lacking the possibility for redress, revenge was upheld as the very lowest level of action believed capable of deflecting the ancestral wrath of those violently slain in war. This belief in conjunction with the crippling of 'peaceful' forms of resolution thus led many Machazians to perpetrate radically violent actions of revenge themselves in what amounted in part to a form of 'socio-spiritual defence'. Each act of violence inevitably gave motive for responses of at least the same magnitude, thus multiplying the number of accusations and violent deaths in a viciously escalating and ever more socially inclusive spiral. During the war Machazians perceived a violent radicalization of the terms of interaction throughout the socio-spiritual world. The war, thus, not only represented a dangerous transformation of social relations among the living, but was seen by the Machazians as a perilous change in relations between the living and the dead.

The Socio-Spiritual Effects of Wartime Migration and Social Change

Wartime migration decisions were also responsive to other social processes that ultimately produced highly gender- and age-specific patterns of wartime population distribution and significantly reconfigured power and social relations within Machazian households. Throughout the war almost twice as many women as men remained in Machaze or in neighbouring rural districts (GTZ 1993, 1996; CARE 1994; Lubkemann 2000a, 2000b, 2000d). By contrast, most adult Machazian men were forced out of the district to the peri-urban areas in South Africa during the first few years of the conflict.

The fact that men were targeted for forced recruitment, and were more likely to be killed played a part in this engendered population re-distribution. However, this pattern also reflected an attempt by both men and women to engage in long-established strategies of socio-economic reproduction in a new wartime environment. The patterns of predominantly male migration to South Africa early in the conflict represented the continuation of long-established coping strategies similar to those employed historically during cycles of intensified colonial labour recruitment (Lubkemann 2000a: 90–95, 100–115, 127–131). Similarly, Machazian women's relocation within the district reflected their preference for rural destinations that allowed them to re-establish some form of subsistence agriculture. Few Machazian women had the desire in the early days of the conflict to join male relatives migrating out of the district.

However, as explored in detail elsewhere (Lubkemann 2000c), attempts at minimizing disruption to established life-strategies were not equally successful for men and women. The war's persistence for almost a decade and a half had far more disruptive effects on agricultural subsistence within Mozambique than it did on wage-labour employment in South Africa. Moreover, the war's intensification and successive droughts throughout the 1980s, which further restricted the possibilities for subsistence, forced more people out of the district. A large population of predominantly women, children, and elderly men⁶ eventually fled to Zimbabwe and settled in UNHCR refugee camps.

As the war progressed Machazian men facing prolonged stays in South Africa began to establish conjugal unions with South African women. Although some of these men essentially abandoned their Mozambican marriages, a majority sought to retain their marital rights with both South African and Mozambican spouses, despite maintaining minimal (if any) contact with the latter, sometimes for well over a decade. This new strategy of 'transnational polygyny' (Lubkemann 2000a, 2000d) allowed Machazian men to have families and children who could contribute to their old age care, while retaining the option of eventual post-conflict return. However, after the war ended in 1992 interest in transnational polygyny continued to grow. Of 200 Machazian men whom I surveyed in South Africa in 1998, 65 per cent were involved in ongoing conjugal relationships in South Africa. Twenty-six per cent had marital relationships only in South Africa, while 23 per cent were involved in marital relationships only in Mozambique (Lubkemann 2000a, 2000d). The

wartime devastation of Mozambique and its uncertain political stability reinforced the long-established importance of employment in South Africa after the war. Moreover, during the war men had increasingly established other important social, legal, and economic ties to South Africa: 72 per cent of those 200 surveyed planned to keep a house in South Africa, and 79 per cent a business, while 47 per cent reported they were enrolled in a pension plan that had to be regularly collected in person in South Africa (Lubkemann 2000d). Many of these men thus began to see South Africa as more than merely a place of employment, but rather a site in which to pursue a social life that paralleled, rather than simply contributed to, their social lives back in Machaze.

By maintaining households in both countries, transnationally polygynous men diversified their risks—an important ‘improvement’ to many in light of different insecurities faced in Mozambique and South Africa. On one hand, inadequate social and medical services, perceived political volatility, and drought represented significant risks faced in Mozambique (Lubkemann 2000a). Yet, in South Africa Machazian men faced rising violence, crime, and xenophobia in the townships. Their illegal status made them particularly vulnerable to crime since it was known they would not report it to authorities, and to widespread extortion by corrupt local officials. The high cost of living and rising unemployment also made township life difficult. In contrast, Machaze afforded much lower living cost options if and when money became tight.

While Machazian men benefited from developing new social and economic options in South Africa through the transnationalization of polygyny, these wartime changes reconfigured the balance of power and the meaning of social relationships within marriages and extended kinship groups in detrimental ways for several other categories of Machazians. In particular, the development of relationships between Machazian men and South African women eroded what benefits women in Machaze had once experienced from polygyny, while accentuating many of the problems experienced because of it. Before the war, polygyny realized solely within Machaze represented an ambiguous combination of potential gains and losses for Machazian women. Whereas a co-wife was often regarded as a rival and potential source of *uloi*, she could also help ease heavy domestic labour requirements. Consequently many women reported suggesting and participating in the selection of an additional wife for their spouse. In a polygynous configuration in which both wives remained in Machaze, a junior wife provided free labour and enhanced the status of a senior wife. Additionally, she often released the first wife from the responsibilities of assisting a mother-in-law, thus affording her greater independence.

In contrast, transnational polygyny afforded no labour relief or enhanced autonomy to Machazian women because transnational co-wives were not physically present in Machaze. Moreover, Machazian wives in these marriages often received a reduced share of resources from husbands, since South African wives had the advantage in pressing their claims because money was earned in

South Africa and men spent more time there. The distribution of benefits among co-wives could also no longer be monitored by Machazian wives in particular, who had to settle for 'leftovers'. While Machazian women remained dependent on migrant husbands for cash, their husbands were now less dependent on them. Accordingly, power within Machazian marriages was redistributed to men's advantage. Whereas Machazian women still had to fulfil the obligations required by marriage (such as assisting mothers-in-law), and these obligations were made more difficult without co-resident co-wives, they lost much of the leverage they once had in enforcing a husband's fulfilment of reciprocal obligations.

South African marriages, in which parents played no part, also significantly reduced the leverage parents exercised over sons and further transformed the meaning of marriage itself. Local kinship alliance imperatives in which senior kin largely dictated the interests at stake did not factor into South African marriages. Moreover, the drain of resources in favour of South African social interests made it a more difficult job to manage extended households that often included wives and children left behind. Heightened dissatisfaction of neglected wives placed marriages at greater risk of failure and consequently threatened the loss of a daughter-in-law's labour. These factors fed parents' ultimate fear that children would neglect their old-age support.

After the conflict, these wartime changes introduced new forms of tension into everyday forms of Machazian social interaction at the domestic and community level. Ultimately, the development of new South African options for men and of transnational polygyny, repositioned migration and marriage in the struggle for power in the Machazian domestic sphere. In transnationally polygynous marriages men and women, and men and their parents, increasingly evidenced mutually exclusive expectations about what marriage should 'mean'—that is, what rights and obligations should the relationship imply. In many ways there was a zero-sum relationship between contesting views, as men's desire to practise transnational polygyny violated the expectations held by Machazian women about marriage. Furthermore, women's and parents' desires to maintain Machaze as the sole point of migrant men's socio-economic reference and investment threatened the risk diversification strategies these men sought to pursue. Marriages became sites of intensified social strife and Machazian men who had developed stronger ties to South Africa were particularly concerned with the socio-spiritual effects of these exacerbated social tensions.

Drawing on this understanding of how wartime changes affected social strife and of how Machazians perceived the relationship between social contention and socio-spiritual interaction, the second half of this article examines how different post-conflict resettlement options presented Machazians with particular socio-spiritual dilemmas. First, a typology of responses to these socio-spiritual dilemmas is established. This typology is then used to categorize the mechanisms that different categories of Machazian social actors used to cope with the socio-spiritual dilemmas implied by their resettlement choices.

Finally comes an analysis of the ways in which gendered (and other) differences in social power allowed some actors to pursue a broader range of strategies that often preserved or enhanced power gains, while forcing others to pursue riskier and more drastic strategies, that at best minimized power loss. I do not undertake a social psychology of return decision-making *per se*; that is, I do not attempt to identify the range of social and psychological factors that led some Machazians to believe one thing and others to believe another. I do not identify how beliefs influenced particular resettlement choices either. Rather, I start my discussion describing resettlement choices that were made and analyse how these choices were negotiated between decision-makers and social others, using a range of interpretive practices that drew upon a set of common symbolic referents and in a context in which differences in social power influenced whose interpretive practices were socially legitimized and whose were not. Thus, the analysis focuses less on what people ‘really believed’ and how beliefs influenced action, and more on how presentations of belief justified particular courses of action and what factored into the social legitimization of some presentations over others.

A Typology of Machazian Responses to Post-Conflict Socio-Spiritual Dilemmas: the ‘Loyalty to Voice Continuum’

In his classic analysis of response to decline in organizations, Hirschman (1970) proposed three possible categories of reaction to dissatisfaction with the terms of interaction in associational life: ‘loyalty’, ‘voice’, and ‘exit’. Loyalty strategies are attempts to realize objectives within the current terms of interaction—to abide by the rules of the game. In contrast, ‘voice’ strategies are attempts to realize objectives by modifying the terms of interaction itself—i.e. by changing the rules of the game. Finally, ‘exit’ strategies are attempts to realize objectives by leaving one milieu of social interaction (or organization) for another with entirely different terms of interaction altogether—i.e. leaving one type of game to play in an altogether different type of game.

It is useful to adapt Hirschman’s analytical typology so that ‘loyalty’ and ‘voice’ are seen as ends on a continuum rather than categorically dichotomous options. With this typology, modification responses are not seen as *either* ‘voice’ or ‘loyalty’ options but as all having *both* voice and loyalty aspects, that vary in their relative weight to each other depending on where the response is located between the two poles of the continuum. Thus, a response located closer to the ‘loyalty’ pole will involve fewer or more superficial challenges to the terms of interaction, whereas those located closer to the ‘voice’ pole will propose more fundamental epistemological shifts in the current terms of interpretation and interaction. Machazian strategies for coping with the socio-spiritual dilemmas posed by particular resettlement options can be analysed as ranging across the entirety of this continuum.

Negotiating Return

Examined within this framework, those who returned to Machaze 'outright' without retaining social investments in South African marriages can be thought of as pursuing options closer to the 'loyalty' end of the continuum. Their strategies resembled those long practised by Machazian labour migrants. Throughout the twentieth century Machazian migrants professed a strong belief in the importance of maintaining connections not only with living relatives but also with their ancestral spirits in Machaze. The fact that ancestors were buried in Machaze also provided it with a form of 'place-specific utility' that played a role in encouraging ultimate permanent settlement in Machaze upon retirement. Throughout their migrant careers Machazian men remained attentive to their obligations vis-à-vis ancestors, believing that illness or misfortune during migration was often a sign that ritual gestures of respect due to ancestral spirits were overdue and necessitated a return. Such ritual obligations included cleaning graves and building or repairing 'houses' built specially for ancestral spirits. They also implied a physical return to Machaze itself. The transformation in status of important social others (such as a father) through death, provided particularly strong motivation for immediate return to Machaze. Many men reported leaving hard won jobs in order to return to Machaze for a funeral that would ensure good socio-spiritual relations with a new ancestor.

Moreover, in contrast to religious beliefs that draw a sharp boundary between worlds of living and spiritual interaction, Machazians believed their ultimate destiny was to continue to interact in death within the same social world they had been active in during their lifetime, albeit from a transformed and more powerful social position as ancestral spirits themselves. The realization of this destiny required preserving physical connections with ancestors⁷ that translated into a strong desire to be buried in Machaze. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this factor in motivating Machazian migrants to return to Machaze, a factor reported widely in other African societies as well (e.g. Caldwell 1969; Gugler 1975; Bourdillon 1991).

While a desire to retain connections with ancestors strongly motivated post-conflict return to Machaze, it is important to acknowledge that a whole range of different socio-spiritual dilemmas motivated returnees, often in conflicting ways that affected timing and destination decisions. Many individuals returned to the district but not to the exact localities they had lived in before the war so as to avoid others whose wartime activity had adversely affected them (or vice versa). Thus, in one post-conflict locality over 60 per cent of the village 'elders' (*madodas*) had lived elsewhere in the district before the war. Returnees were also concerned with the 'loose' *mfukwas* produced by the violent deaths and non-burial of soldiers. Local communities and churches often organized rituals to capture and 'send home' these spirits whose origin outside of Machazian socio-spiritual worlds made them particularly dangerous because they had no living ancestors and thus no potential and positive vested interests in Machaze.

Finally, many Machazians waited to return until rain ceremonies that were disallowed by the pre-war regime⁸ were successfully re-instated by local headmen. Ultimately, many returnees to Machaze believed the potential consequences of offending ancestors outweighed other risks (water scarcity, chronic drought, and landmines in particular) that return entailed.

Investing in 'Token Return'

Prolonged absence from Machaze and consequent failures to perform necessary rituals during the war were often described in interviews as 'excused' by the spirits in light of the war's exigent circumstances. However, when return became possible Machazian men in South Africa faced greater challenges justifying to others (and even to themselves) any further deferral of these obligations or of return. In particular, men with South African wives feared that discontented spouses and elderly parents back in Machaze might trigger ancestral sanctions from *vadzimu* or more grievous harm via *mfukwas*.

In contrast to those who returned to Machaze outright after the war, those who desired to maintain socio-economic investments made in South Africa were forced to explore options further from the 'loyalty' end of the continuum. They thus faced a greater challenge in having their choices acknowledged as legitimate realizations (rather than violations) of the recognized socio-moral order. Two specific strategies—of 'token return' and of 'deferred contingent return'—represented attempts to justify maintaining socio-economic investments in South Africa in what were primarily 'loyalty' terms—i.e. not as challenges to the fundamental rules of the socio-moral order but as novel ways of realizing it. Most importantly, both of these strategies acknowledged the non-negotiability of Machaze as the primary point of socio-spiritual symbolic reference, but proposed novel interpretations of what ongoing investments in South Africa signalled about their ultimate investment in and attachment to Machaze itself.

Transnationally polygynous men contested claims that a zero-sum game relationship existed between their investments in Machaze and those in South Africa. It is important to realize that the distribution of investment between Machazian and South African poles did vary considerably among these men. Whereas some invested as much or even more heavily in Machaze than they did in South Africa, the strategies of those who invested primarily in South Africa are of primary interest to this analysis. Some men returned briefly to Machaze in order to obtain a wife in Machaze to live with their elderly parents, before returning to South Africa where they focused most of their interests, energies, and time. Through such 'marriages,' men essentially absent from Machaze were able to fulfil many of their prescribed duties towards mothers and ancestors.

In one case a Machazian man had briefly returned and rebuilt three huts on his deceased father's homestead—one for his mother, one for a new wife whom he brought to live with and help his mother, and a third for himself. Although

he had not returned since this visit five years previously, he had sent money to his mother and wife and for a brother to build a ritual house for their father's spirit because of reported 'spiritual problems'. His primary concern was that his wife, who felt abandoned, might have to be sent home to her parents because her discontent was stirring up spiritual activity, thus leaving his mother without assistance and likely to become unhappy herself. With two adult, married sons living in South Africa, with two South African wives living with him in his home with plumbing and electricity, and with his own car and taxi business, he admitted the low likelihood of ever returning to actually live in 'his' hut in Machaze. Instead, he hoped to counter the emerging spiritual problem occasioned by his continued absence by sending more money to use as *lobola* in obtaining another wife in Machaze to live with their mother. Transnational polygyny allowed such men to simultaneously remain in South Africa while responding to critical moral imperatives, through what amounted to 'token returns'.

Narrating 'Deferred/Contingent Return'

Other men with considerable investment in South Africa pursued strategies of 'deferred/contingent' return, by reframing their continued presence in South Africa as delays in, rather than a definitive break with, social investment back in Machaze. One migrant interviewed in South Africa who pursued this strategy felt that his poor health signalled a need to return to Machaze in order to appease ancestral spirits. He elaborated highly detailed and concrete plans for his future post-return life in Machaze (constructing houses, starting a grinding mill and chicken raising business, drilling a well) that contrasted sharply with his vagueness about when exactly that return would occur. Interestingly, return was always stated as an imperative that was attached to indeterminate conditionality in its timing: 'of course I *must* return... *but* I must make sure I have enough money for the trip and for drilling (the well)... I *will* go soon... *but* my son *must first* be well established in his work so all is well here...' Another man claimed to be postponing his return to Machaze because he lacked money for the trip. However, he lived in one of the better houses in the township with internal plumbing, five rooms, a stereo and a colour TV. He had a job that allowed him to play the lottery every day and was proud of the support he received from his son whom he described as working in Johannesburg as a medical technician. Although he clearly could afford to go back he seemed uninterested in doing so soon or in making significant investments back in Machaze.

Frequently such 'narratives of intended return' (Lubkemann 2000d) reframed delay not as a matter of reluctance to return, but as a desire to ensure the quality and success of that return, sometimes even emphasizing the responsibility that returnees had towards others and the need to remain abroad in order to save enough money to fulfil these responsibilities. These performances were structured to emphasize the inevitability and desirability

of 'return' as an end while simultaneously emphasizing conditionality and indeterminacy in defining means to that end. Thus, 'narratives of intended return' were performance devices that paradoxically affirmed a connection to Machaze while justifying an ongoing absence from Machaze and continued social investment elsewhere. These performances thus effectively negotiated the socio-spiritual dilemmas created by the growth of wartime socio-economic investment in South Africa. Such 'narratives of intended return' might be seen above all as claims about moral positioning in a socio-spiritual world, rather than clear expressions of intentions to return or actual return. More than expressing intentions to go back to Machaze, narratives of 'intended return' were always public claims about the way social relations 'should be' and about how current activity met socio-spiritual obligations. Thus, these presentations legitimized the continued participation of 'non-returnees' in a community in which those who retained active investments in affairs back in Mozambique constituted a 'moral majority'.

As explained elsewhere (Lubkemann 2000d), there were significant reasons why Machazian migrants primarily oriented towards South Africa wanted to remain within the Machazian community—i.e. to continue interact with other Machazians in South Africa. In a competitive labour market, ethnic networks were critical for securing jobs or assistance during unemployment. In responding to growing xenophobia and crime in South Africa, these networks also provided the only alternative for illegal immigrants unable to avail themselves of legal recourse. A more complex set of issues involved new domestic strategies. In cases of marital dispute or dissolution, South African spouses sometimes used their Mozambican husband's illegal status as leverage. After the war some men replaced South African wives with women brought from Machaze (who had neither supporting kinship networks nor legal status in South Africa) in order to solve this problem. Despite their disinterest in Machaze, these men hoped to confine the social interaction of Machazian wives and children to Machazian social circles in order to counter the influence of what they perceived as a moral laxity in South African society that threatened their patriarchal authority. Migrant men thus participated in the Machazian community not only as an economic network but also as a socio-moral mechanism for reproducing power configurations and defining terms of social interaction that served their interests. Maintaining Machazian identity and community was paradoxically a way for men disinterested in Machaze itself to deal with various South African-specific problems entailed by their permanent residence in the townships.

However, it is also critical to realize that Machazian 'narratives of intended return' were presentations of self (Goffman 1974) performed not only for those living in the Machazian community but also to its spiritual inhabitants, in many ways regarded as the 'box seat' occupants for these performances. As such, they were claims made to the full audience of those perceived to exercise important forms of sanction over one's fortune in life. In fact, such narratives were performed in a variety of ways that redefined roles in Machazian religious

institutions and transformed the marketplace of religious organizations. The business of negotiating postponements of return to Machaze was a booming cottage industry in South Africa in 1997–98. Whereas Machazian ‘nyangas’ and ‘nhamossoros’ were reported as rarely if ever active in South Africa before the war, their services in negotiating postponements of return with ancestral spirits were in high demand after the conflict. Moreover, after the war church *profetas* became increasingly active in such mediation roles whereas they had shunned such involvement before it.

Both strategies of ‘token return’ and ‘deferred/contingent return’ represent a move further away from the ‘loyalty’ pole on the ‘loyalty-voice’ continuum of strategies for coping with the socio-spiritual dilemmas implied by post-conflict resettlement choices. Nevertheless, both these strategies justified change within already existent terms of interaction, in a sense casting aspects of ‘voice’ in ‘loyalty’ terms. As with strategies of ‘token return’, practices of social disinvestment from Machaze were interpreted as affirmations of, rather than challenges to the non-negotiability of Machaze’s monopoly on centrality in the socio-spiritual world.

Voicing Strategies of ‘Re-Place-Ment’

In contrast, the strategies deployed to cope with socio-spiritual dilemmas by the minority of Machazian men (under 15 per cent) who openly sought to constitute post-conflict lives solely in South Africa without any return or investment back in Machaze, evidenced stronger elements of ‘voice.’ Many of these men actually brought their Machazian wives to live with them in South Africa after the war. What distinguished these men from the majority of other migrants was their affirmation that they did not suffer sanctions from spirits as a result of their decisions to remain permanently in South Africa, and that their ancestors had accepted this relocation as permanent.

The spirits’ tolerance of this choice was explained with reference to historical events. Specifically, the Machazian origin myth that narrates original migration from Eastern Zimbabwe into the Machazian lowlands, and the historically documented migration of Machazians to Bilene in southern Mozambique under the pre-colonial ruler Gugunhanna (in the 1880s) were invoked as parallels to the wartime forced migration and resettlement of Machazians in South Africa. Both of these historical migrations involved permanent resettlement away from ‘original’ ancestral graves. This exegesis posited that historical occasions of permanent resettlement had avoided spiritual repercussions because they originated in exigent circumstances and involved respectful consultation with the ancestors. In particular, ancestors had been notified about their descendants’ new whereabouts so they could ‘find’ and continue to interact with the living, thus reconstituting the socio-spiritual world. Key leaders among those who had decided to re-settle permanently in South Africa claimed to have successfully engaged in similar notifications, which legitimized their own permanent relocation. As one

respondent put it 'When I die I will be an ancestor here (in South Africa) no, I will not make my children go back to Machaze, but rather they must come back here.'

While still clearly drawing on fundamental epistemological elements of Machazian religious beliefs, such narratives proposed a profound re-ordering of those elements. In particular, they challenged the notion of Machaze as the central and single stable referent for organizing the socio-spiritual world and socio-moral order, thus dislodging it from a non-negotiable position in socio-spiritual interaction. In fact, narratives actually propose for South Africa a form of moral anchorage that was previously only attributed to Machaze through the claim that one's own spirit will compel children to remain oriented to the newly negotiated 'home' in South Africa.

Such 'narratives of re-place-ment' constituted far more radical infusions of 'voice' into strategies for coping with the perceived socio-spiritual challenges of displacement. Though these narratives were not uncontested and were only pursued by a minority, it is important to note that their public proposal was also not grounds for immediate marginalization by other Machazian community members in South Africa. In fact, far from being marginal members of the community, these men often played pivotal and powerful roles in its organization, as pastors and in other influential and respected capacities.

Exiting Marginalization

Perhaps the most radical strategies for coping with the socio-spiritual dilemmas of post-conflict resettlement options were deployed by a small group of Machazian women whose extreme marginalized position was the product of wartime displacement. The same transnational strategies that allowed Machazian men to guard and enhance their life-strategies, increasingly forced some Machazian wives to face extremely difficult and equally marginalizing choices related to the realization of their fertility.⁹ Facing prolonged spousal separation¹⁰ some women could only bear children—the critical element of future security—through culturally prohibited sexual unions with men other than their husbands. However, this option made divorce more likely and placed these women's children at risk in the case of divorce. Alternatively, women could remain faithful to absent husbands and risk having few or no children. The social organization of wartime displacement thus created a contradiction for women that could only be resolved by fulfilling one cultural prescription at the expense of the other.¹¹ For many women this dilemma became more acute as the war came to span more of their fertile years or robbed them of children already born.

Most women facing such choices opted to have children, even at the expense of doing so 'legitimately'. Some women who stayed in Machaze during the war bore children with soldiers. Others in UNHCR camps in Zimbabwe moved away from kin in order to bear children free from their social vigilance and disapproval. After the war, many of these women faced claims from husbands

or affines on children produced in extra-marital wartime unions. Many women whose children were the product of non-consensual unions and wartime rape also faced similar threats of being divorced and losing children that had been borne as a result of their violent sexual exploitation during the conflict.

As examined in greater depth elsewhere (Lubkemann, 2000c), these women faced considerable disadvantages in pressing their claims to these children in the face of prevalent Machazian ideologies of kinship that privileged the rights of patrilineages who had paid *lobola*. Accordingly, many of these women opted not to return to Machaze after the war. Others in this predicament actually left Machaze for the first time *after* the war. Despite high costs of living that made subsistence a challenge, many of these women settled 200 kilometres to the north, in the peri-urban shantytowns around the provincial capital of Chimoio.

More than merely removing themselves from Machaze as a place, these women sought to extricate themselves entirely from the Machazian socio-spiritual world by minimizing their interaction with other Machazians in Chimoio.¹² Fearful not only that legal claims might be pressed against them, these women sought to counter the potential sanctions of reproachful Machazian spirits. By minimizing contact with other Machazians and in particular with kin whose reproach their residence in Chimoio was likely to invite, they believed they could lessen the chance of being found by these spirits and of being made both the targets of *uloi* and accused of causing it. 'My friends are from the church and the market' remarked one such woman in Chimoio, 'because there are fewer *complicoes* (complications) when they are not also from Machaze. When I worked near my (ex-) husband's wife she would tell her husband if I made more money. Then they said that I was making (spiritual) problems for her son. They wanted to take my children. That is why they have called me back to Machaze'. Another woman explained that despite a strong desire to find a husband who would support her and her children, she had refused the proposals of several Machazian suitors: 'I want nothing with them because they are from Machaze—I will marry anybody, *anybody except a man from Machaze*.' Such responses embody what can be thought of in terms of Hirschman's typology as strategies of 'exit'—attempts to realize objectives by leaving one 'game' to participate in another one rather than either abiding by its rules ('loyalty') or attempting to modify them ('voice').

Many of these women joined Protestant churches in Chimoio that were distinguished precisely by the fact that they had no sister congregations in Machaze itself. Virtually all the congregations in which migrant men in South Africa participated had counterparts back in Machaze. The strong popularity among these women of the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (Universal Kingdom of God Church) and the Igreja Evangelica Cristo Vive (Jesus Lives Evangelical Church) constituted alternative social support networks for them. Indeed, it also allowed them to interact with other Machazian women like themselves without the threat of spiritual sanctions, by re-casting these women in the role of 'church sisters' rather than 'Machazian women'.

The focus in these churches' teachings also struck a noteworthy contrast to the emphasis of teachings in churches attended by Machazians in South Africa and in Machaze itself. As others have also noted (Chingono 1995), the charismatic Protestant churches attended by these women emphasize the importance of the nuclear family—and in particular the mutual rights of spouses—rather than extended kinship obligations, reflecting their recent Western source (the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus is Brazilian in origin and has large congregations in the USA and Portugal). The emphasis on nuclear family obligations ratified the sense of injustice these women felt as a result of wartime spousal abandonment and justified their own actions, while the emphasis in these charismatic congregations on 'holy spirit power' promised strong protection against ancestral spirits de-legitimized by being re-cast as 'demons'. In contrast, the Zionist denominations in Machaze that had been brought back by Machazians from the mines decades prior to the war tended to emphasize extended kinship obligations and to realize and work within, rather than challenge, the terms of the established socio-moral order (Lubkemann 2000a). Only within the terms of the new socio-spiritual worlds afforded by the Charismatic movements in Chimoio were radically marginalized Machazian women empowered to re-establish new networks with the living and ward off the unwanted sanction of spirits.

Conclusion: Social Power in Reconstituting Socio-Spiritual Worlds

Anthropologists have long been attentive to the complex ways in which religious beliefs can serve to define social identities by delimiting the membership of 'moral communities', by assigning social actors particular positions within them, and by providing interpretations of the moral value of activity (Evans-Pritchard 1956; Barth 1969; Dumont 1970; Bloch 1986; Werbner 1989; Geschiere 1997). However, the ways in which religious beliefs authorize inclusion or exclusion or structure behaviour is not simply a matter of enacting self-evident and uncontested meanings. Precisely because they carry the 'symbolic power' (Bourdieu 1991) to authorize action and demarcate community, religious beliefs are critical resources whose meanings are constantly contested. Other forms of power—symbolic and material—are mobilized in these contests in an attempt to shape the terms of authorization themselves. In conclusion, this analysis focuses on the ways in which other forms of social power bear on which authorizing claims are socially legitimized and which are not, and thus ultimately on the degree to which 'voice', 'loyalty', and 'exit' options are available to different categories of social actors.

The strategies reviewed in this article represented the attempts by a range of social actors with very different levels of social power to reconstitute socio-spiritual worlds that could preserve or enhance their own social positions. Which strategies were available to social actors in their attempts to authorize post-conflict resettlement options whose meanings were subject to being contested by other Machazian community members, was highly dependent on

the very different levels and forms of social power available to different categories of Machazians.

Those Machazian women who resettled in Chimoio after the war faced a range of options that promised extreme social marginalization and heightened risks to their life-strategies if they remained within the Machazian moral community. Returning to Machaze, they faced the loss of means for old-age security and likely accusations of witchcraft. Alternatively, by defying the claims of significant and more powerful social others—living and dead alike—and remaining in Chimoio, they perceived a strong risk of suffering severe spiritual sanctions. Leaving Machaze might afford recourse against the sanctions of the living but did not guarantee protection against spirits. The Machazian socio-spiritual world thus only offered these women a choice between positions of heightened marginalization and danger to their life-strategies and ultimately extreme degradation in their status and security relative to pre-war conditions. The socio-spiritual dilemma these women faced was thus structurally different from that confronted by migrant Machazian men in South Africa, between a return to the pre-war status quo and the preservation of enhanced social positions and security assurances.

Facing not only structurally different socio-spiritual dilemmas these groups were also differentiated by the far greater social power wielded by Machazian men in South Africa. Male leaders in the Machazian community in South Africa—those most successful in pursuing ‘voice’ options—benefited from forms of ‘internal power’ and ‘external power’ that Machazian women in Chimoio did not have. These men accrued influence from culturally prescribed age and gender values subscribed to within the Machazian community—‘internal power’ in the sense that it rested on the values of their social group. Their ‘external power’ stemmed from their connections outside the Machazian community, and the critical importance of these connections to the community’s members. These men’s position as brokers made it safer for them to propose significant reconfigurations in the rules of the socio-moral order by making their narratives less likely to be challenged by others. The risk of losing access to their essential services discouraged those who disagreed from strident opposition of the type that could be exercised without fear of sanction against those less socially powerful, such as women resettled in Chimoio.

Social power thus figured as a critical factor in distinguishing among different actors’ possibilities for successfully using strategies of ‘voice’ in reconstituting socio-spiritual worlds. Unable to successfully deploy ‘voice’ options, and in a situation in which alternatives of ‘loyalty’ promised only to reproduce marginalization within socio-spiritual worlds, women in Chimoio could only counter the deterioration in their status and security by availing themselves of ‘exit’ options. ‘Voice’ and ‘exit’ may thus represent alternatives at one end of a continuum of options available to actors whose social position has been affected by wartime displacement in either empowering or disempowering ways that lead them to question choices closer to the ‘loyalty’ pole. ‘Voice’—the ability to put forth novel interpretations and reconfigurations *and to see*

such claims socially legitimized—is most available to those who both already benefit from internal power *and* can draw on external power as well. To those who have neither, ‘exit’ may become the most viable, or the least unattractive, option.

The Machazian case clearly demonstrates that religious beliefs factor significantly into the constitution of a sense of displacement and in the mix of motivating forces that influence crisis migration decision-making. Reactions to violence must account for its perceived effects on socio-spiritual relations in contexts where cultural beliefs identify domains of social interaction as having a socio-spiritual dimension. Finally, spiritual beliefs are themselves contested as a result of wartime social change. These beliefs both authorize power in these contests and are subjected to different degrees of epistemological reconfiguration in light of the power differences brought to bear in making claims by implicated social actors. These differences play a critical role in establishing which strategies are available to different social actors within a ‘loyalty’ to ‘voice/exit’ continuum.

1. The population in Machaze is almost entirely ethnically Ndaou, although ethnic identity is only self-ascribed as an identity marker outside of the district in contexts of frequent interaction with people of other ethnic backgrounds. Even then it is not the most common term chosen by these people to identify themselves. Individuals from Machaze most frequently identify themselves as members of particular families from a particular *regulo*’s (local chief’s) area when interacting with others from the district or immediate surrounding areas. When interacting with Mozambicans from other areas of the country they most frequently choose to identify themselves as ‘from Machaze’ rather than in ethnic terms as Ndaou. This term ‘from Machaze’ is deployed even by those who have left Machaze permanently in most contexts in which they interact with other Mozambicans. (When interacting with South Africans or Zimbabweans they usually attempt to pass as nationals of those countries—either as Shona or Shangaana—in order to hide their illegal status.) Accordingly the term ‘Machazians’ is used in this study as a translation of this expression to refer to the population that is the subject of this research.
2. In Machaze *mfukwa* referred not to an essentialized category of spirit but to a state into which a spirit entered because of violent death, being wronged in the extreme, or having grievously transgressed the socio-moral order in life. Thus particularly powerful and/or oppressive chiefs (suspected of using *uloi* themselves to become powerful) were often believed to reappear as *mfukwas* after death. Those who committed suicide were also feared as potential *mfukwas*. People reported that during the war their own relatives who perished violently assumed this state. This appears to have been a wartime shift in beliefs, since it was reported that prior to the war the dead only acted as *vadzimu* vis-à-vis their own kin, a report confirmed by scholarly accounts of Ndaou beliefs earlier in the century (Curtis 1920; Rennie 1973). Historically, the distinction between *vadzimu* and *mfukwa* may have been categorical, although the evidence is unclear (Lubkemann 2000a).
3. Usually *nyangas* were associated with divination and the diagnosis of a problem and *nhamossolos* with the ‘capture’ of and intercession with troubling spirits, although many individuals occupied both roles simultaneously.

4. Stated beliefs about the involvement of the spirits of the dead in the lives of the living and the role of the Holy Spirit varied widely among over two dozen different denominations of Protestant-inspired churches in Machaze. Only one church (American Board) denied the activity of ancestral spirits outright, professing however that demons did interact in the lives of the living, 'posing' as ancestors. Some of its members (and even pastors) consulted *nyangas* nevertheless. All churches thus professed the ability of spirits (of one form or another) to intervene in the everyday lives of the living, saw this activity as rampant, and attempted to provide means of dealing with it through the activity of *profetas*. The Holy Spirit was thus invoked by some in order to expel or protect against demons, by others to protect against *mfukwas*, and by yet others to negotiate with *vadzimu* from a position of power.
5. Elsewhere (Lubkemann 2000, 2001) I have dealt in considerable detail with the ways in which local socio-economic relations in Machaze had been transformed and social tensions intensified during the three decades prior to the war, such that accusations of witchcraft and social differentiation had both increased. Similarly I engage in greater detail the vigorous and growing historiographic debate over the degree to which the Mozambican civil war was 'fragmented' by local social interests that varied throughout the country.
6. Those men who did not migrate to South Africa during the war usually fell into one of three categories: those recruited by the military; young men who had not yet undertaken a migratory labour trip abroad; and older men who had retired from migratory careers. As the war progressed younger and older men tended to move in patterns similar to those of Machazian women (and frequently in their company), with the exception that once in Zimbabwe, younger men sought (illegally) work outside the refugee camps on farms or in other wage labour opportunities while retaining contact and mutual support with camp-settled relatives.
7. In Machazian religious beliefs spirits need physical connections to lead them to the living with whom they interact. Thus in *uloi* it is believed that a victim's hair or nails, or touching a common object, or crossing a victim's path, allow *mfukwas* to find their victims. Despite being powerful, spirits are seen to have human-like frailties such as the ability to get lost, become confused, or even be tricked. Thus for example, oral accounts focus on the importance of physical letters in assisting ancestral spirits to 'find' migrants who worked outside known mine areas (Lubkemann 2000a).
8. Many Machazians identified the post-independence government's policy of prohibiting rain ceremonies and desecrating the graves of chiefs as a primary cause for the war itself (Lubkemann 2000a).
9. Polygyny allowed men to obtain old-age support through marriages to younger women as well as from children. Women, however, were more likely to have a spouse die before they did and less likely to remarry after being widowed. Consequently, children provided the only source of old-age support for older Machazian women, making fertility more critical to their old age security than it was for men.
10. Strategies of transnational polygyny depended on the ability of Machazian men to keep their Mozambican spouses from joining them in South Africa. Machazian men often engaged in misinformation tactics or in attempts to indefinitely defer assistance to wives who did attempt to join them (Lubkemann 2000d).

11. Within Machazian cultural prescriptions fertility was a far more 'time-embedded' (Malmberg 1997) project—in the sense that it had to be realized within more narrowly prescribed temporal parameters for women than it was for men. Thanks to culturally prescribed polygyny and biology an adult man's fertility could span most of his lifetime. By contrast, Machazian women's fertility was biologically more time-restricted and culturally limited to children they alone gave birth to.
12. Chimoio was an internal migration destination from Machaze before the war. It garnered a large internally displaced population from Machaze during the war. Many who returned from there to Machaze after the war retained houses and social or economic interests in Chimoio as well.

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